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Researchers into Montana contract law are deeply indebted to the compilers of MON-
TANA ANNOTATIONS TO THE RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1940) prepared by the
faculty of the School of Law under the auspices of the Montana Bar Association. In recog-
nition of the accuracy and the continuing value of the work, this article cites few of the pre-
1935 cases discussed in the Annotations sections on damages prepared by Dean C. W.
Leaphart. The intervening years have seen the publication of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS (1981). Occasional footnotes indicate the location of the topic in the Annota-
tions (and thus in the Restatement) and in the Restatement (Second).
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I. INTRODUCTION
When an attorney is analyzing the potential outcome of a con-
tract dispute, or when a judge has found that a breach has oc-
curred, each must consider the measure of damages.' In most con-
tract cases, the plaintiff is entitled to the "expectancy": the
damages which will place the plaintiff in the same position as if the
defendant had fully performed.2 For example, in Mitchell v. Carl-
son,3 where Carlson promised to build Mitchell a home of first-
class construction for $11,000, but used inferior materials, the
court4 upheld a jury award of $2000, "the cost of making the re-
pairs necessary to complete the house in accordance with the par-
ties' agreement.' According to the expectancy theory, the $2000, if
applied to repairs, would give Mitchell what he bargained for: a
home of first-class construction at a net cost to him of $11,000.
The term "expectancy" is misleading, for it does not represent
a party's actual expectations. Parties to a contract expect perform-
ance. If they get breach rather than performance, they do not get
what they expected. To the extent a system of contract damages
does not deter breach, actual expectations will not be satisfied. The
system is therefore deficient if it only ameliorates and does not de-
ter.' Furthermore, the symmetry of the expectancy theory rests on
the assumption that plaintiffs will collect the damages that give
them the benefit of the bargain at no cost to themselves-that
Mitchell will net $2000 in his action against Carlson. The tenuous-
ness of this assumption was elegantly demonstrated by the New
Hampshire Supreme Court in a case involving the rule that a cred-
itor's acceptance of part payment does not discharge a debt be-
cause the creditor was entitled to the payment and received noth-
ing more:
1. MONT. CoDE ANN. § 27-1-202 (1981) provides:
Every person who suffers detriment from the unlawful act or omission of another
may recover from the person in fault a compensation therefor in money, which is
called damages.
2. MONT. COns ANN. § 27-1-303 (1981) provides:
No person can recover a greater amount in damages for the breach of an obliga-
tion than he could have gained by the full performance thereof on both sides un-
less a greater recovery is specified by statute.
See MONTANA ANNOTATIONS TO TIE RESTATnNT OF Tm LAW OF CONTRACTS § 329 (1940)
[hereinafter ANNOTATIONS]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 344(a), 347 (1981).
3. 132 Mont 1, 313 P.2d 717 (1957).
4. Unless otherwise stated, "the court" refers to the Montana Supreme Court.
5. Mitchell, 132 Mont. at 7, 313 P.2d at 720.
6. Surveys of the expectancy theory include Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of
Contract, 70 COLUM. L. RPv. 1145 (1970) and Vernon, Expectancy Damages for Breach of
Contract: A Primer and Critique, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 179 (1976).
[Vol. 44
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If costs always equal the expense of litigation, if interest is always
full recompense for delayed payment, and if an execution is al-
ways equivalent to money in hand, then a present part payment
of a debt in cash is in fact never beneficial to the creditor or det-
rimental to the debtor, and can never be a consideration for a
discharge of the balance. Whatever the conclusions of scholastic
logic, as men having some acquaintance with affairs of judges are
bound to know that none of these propositions are always, if ever
true.'
Knowing "that none of these propositions are always, if ever
true," the promisor has little incentive to perform.' At the time
Mitchell discovered the defects, Carlson had a choice: perform ac-
cording to the terms of the contract at a cost of about $2000, or
breach the contract and pay damages, which should amount to
about $2000. 9 Because breach would be no more costly than per-
formance, Mitchell's threat of legal action would have little effect
on Carlson's choice."0 Of greater effect would be less quantifiable
considerations: the effect of the dispute on future relationships be-
tween the parties and on the reputation of the parties in the com-
munity.1 Such considerations aside, because legal action will cost
Mitchell an immediate loss of time, attorneys' fees, expenses, the
loss of use of money, and possible further proceedings to enforce a
judgment, he will probably settle the dispute for an amount con-
siderably less than his expectancy.'
One would expect two consequences to follow from these ob-
servations: (1) parties disappointed in their expectations will not
pursue their remedies through the legal system; and (2) if they do
utilize the legal system, they will seek damages other than or in
addition to loss of the benefit of the bargain." The first hypothesis
7. Frye v. Hubbell, 74 N.H. 358, 374, 68 A. 325, 333 (1907).
8. See infra notes 295-332 and accompanying text.
9. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. RaV. 457, 462 (1897):
Nowhere is the confusion between legal and moral ideas more manifest than in the
law of contract. ... The duty to keep a contract at common law means a predic-
tion that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,-and nothing else.
10. See Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite-The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80
YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Leff]: "Under the.American law of contracts, after
the other party has fully performed his obligations it is absolutely irrational for you fully to
perform yours." The irrationality may disappear once reputation is considered. Id. at 6 n.13.
11. "Most people carry out their agreements because they carry out their agreements,
not because awful things will happen to them if they don't." Id. at 27. Leff presents an
excellent economic analysis of the collection process.
12. The failure of traditional contract analysis to deal with everyday business situa-
tions is explored in Rosett, Contract Performance: Promises, Conditions and the Obligation
to Communicate, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 1083 (1975).
13. Another possibility is that parties use the legal system when they cannot resolve
19831
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is beyond the scope of this article, but is supported by the limited
empirical data that has been collected.1
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This article examines the second hypothesis by gathering and
commenting upon Montana statutes and case law in the area of
expectancy damages for breach of contract.' 5 The nineteenth cen-
tury formalists sought to lay down fixed rules that could be fol-
lowed for the resolution of any factual dispute that might arise."6
Regrettably for those who seek such orderly consistency, no clear
statement of rules to guide future decisions will emerge from this
study. In this perhaps more than any other area of law, the results
depend on the particular fact situation. As Corbin put it: "The
supposed 'rules' within this field have always been stated, ever
since the abolition of the common law forms of action, as tentative
working rules so worded as to give the court a considerable amount
of discretion in their application to the specific facts of a case. '1 7
II. FORESEEABILITY
Prior to 1854, a party in breach could be held liable for all the
losses sustained by the aggrieved party.'8 The absence of guide-
lines subjected commercial enterprises to risks for breach of con-
tract similar to tort liability."9 In 1854, the English Court of the
disputes of fact without intervention. This was the case in Mitchell, 132 Mont. at 4-5, 313
P.2d at 718-19, where the parties disputed the terms of an oral agreement and the reasona-
ble cost of repairs, among other things.
14. See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, CoNmTACr LAW IN AMERICA (1965); Macaulay, Non-Con-
tractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963). Even a
cursory examination of the contract cases decided by the Montana Supreme Court reveals
that they generally involve one-shot deals or marginal enterprises where future relationships
are not an issue. The substantial business organization involved in frequent contractual re-
lationships with suppliers, customers, and personnel does not utilize the court system-and
perhaps not even the principles of contract law-to resolve the disputes that arise. This
interesting phenomenon merits further inquiry.
15. A future article will examine restitution, reliance, rescission, and specific perform-
ance, among other alternative remedies. Available remedies are discussed at ANNOTATIONS,
supra note 2, § 326; RESTATEMENT (S-coND) OF CONTRACTS § 345 (1981).
16. An entertaining and challenging view of the construction-and demolition-of the
formalist edifice is found in G. G.MORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
17. 5 A. CoRBIN, A COMPREHENsiVE TRBATtSE ON THE WORKING RULEs OF CoNTRACT
LAW 111 (1964) [hereinafter cited as A. CORBIN, CoNrACrs]. Cf. the Montana court, in de-
ciding which formula to use for the determination of damages for property loss: "While such
methods serve as useful guides, the final answer rests in good sense rather than mechanical
application of such formulas." Spackman v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 147 Mont. 500, 506, 414
P.2d 918, 922 (1966).
. 18. McCormick, The Contemplation Rule as a Limitation Upon Damages for Breach
of Contract, 19 MINN. L. REv. 497 (1935) [hereinafter cited as McCormick].
19. 5 A. COSIN, CoNmAcTs § 1019 (1964). MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-317 (1981)
provides:
For the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, the measure of damages,
4
Montana Law Review, Vol. 44 [1983], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol44/iss1/1
CONTRACT DAMAGES
Exchequer in Hadley v. Baxendale20 established standards for con-
tract damages that have become universally accepted.2 1
Under the first rule of Hadley, the aggrieved party may re-
cover those damages "as may fairly and reasonably be considered
...arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things
from such breach of contract itself. 22 Application of this rule has
posed few problems, for it allows recovery for risks that any rea-
sonable person would have contemplated. For example, in Hadley
itself, plaintiff miller claimed losses for defendant shipper's late
delivery of a millshaft. The damages ordinarily resulting from this
breach would be loss of the rental value of the millshaft2
Montana codified the first Hadley-rule in the first sentence of
what is now section 27-1-311 of the Montana Code Annotated:
For the breach of an obligation arising from contract, the measure
of damages, except when otherwise expressly provided by this
code, is the amount which will compensate the party aggrieved
for all the detriment which was proximately caused thereby or in
the ordinary course of things would be likely to result therefrom.
Interpretation of this rule has been generally straightforward. For
example, in Green v. Wolff24 the breaching party claimed that the
loss of profits on breach of an agreement to deliver steers was not
within its contemplation. The court properly held that loss of prof-
its resulted in the usual course of things from the breach of an
agreement to share in the proceeds of a business endeavor.2 This
situation may be compared to that in Hall v. Advance-Rumley
Thresher Co.,26 where plaintiff claimed that defendant's late deliv-
ery of equipment caused him to lose profits on a contract he had
entered in reliance on the delivery. The court held that plaintiff
failed to prove that the defendant knew about the contract. Be-
except where otherwise expressly provided by this code, is the amount which will
compensate for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could
have been anticipated or not.
20. 9 Ex. 341 (1854).
21. See generally ANNOTATIONS, supra note 2, § 330; RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 351 (1981). On the special case of the foreseeability of the expense of litigation, see
ANNOTATIONS, supra note 2, § 334; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 351, comment c
(1981).
22. Hadley, 9 Ex. at 354.
23. In Martel Constr., Inc. v. Gleason Equip., Inc., 166 Mont. 479, 534 P.2d 883 (1975),
the court held that rental value of a crane was the proper measure of damages for late
delivery of parts necessary to operate it, but did not award damages where time of delivery
was not of the essence.
24. 140 Mont. 413, 372 P.2d 427 (1962).
25. Id. at 418-20, 372 P.2d at 431.
26. 65 Mont. 566, 212 P. 290 (1923).
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cause the defendant had no knowledge of these special circum-
stances, it could be held liable, like the defendant in Hadley, only
for the natural result of delay-loss of the rental value of the
equipment.2
7
The significance of Hadley is not in defining where liability
attaches, for prior to Hadley liability attached to all consequences.
The significance is that the second rule of Hadley limits damages
to losses "such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the
contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract
as the probable result of the breach of it.""8 That is, the parties are
presumed to have assumed the "natural" risks under the first rule.
Under the second rule, they are presumed to have assumed only
the risks that could be contemplated either expressly or impliedly
from the circumstances. Risks they do not wish to assume may be
limited by contractual provision.29 For example, in Hadley itself,
plaintiff sought lost profits for the period that he was not able to
operate the mill. The court held that in the absence of notice, de-
fendant could not have contemplated this loss; he did not know
that plaintiff did not have a spare millshaft available or that the
mill was not stopped for other reasons."0
The court in Hadley stated that "it is obvious that, in the
great multitude of cases of millers sending off broken shafts to
third persons by a carrier under ordinary circumstances, such con-
sequences would not, in all probability, have occurred; and these
27. Id. at 576-77, 212 P. at 292-93. The court found that defendant lacked knowledge
under the now-discredited "tacit agreement" test. See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying
text.
In addition, the court held that plaintiff did not prove that the detriment-the loss of
profits on the contract-was proximately caused by defendant's breach. Plaintiff apparently
would not have been able to perform his contract even if the equipment had arrived on
time. Hall, 65 Mont. at 577-78, 212 P. at 293.
28. Hadley, 9 Ex. at 354.
29. An unusual application of the Hadley doctrine appeared in Hardin v. Hill, 149
Mont. 68, 423 P.2d 309 (1967). Plaintiff sought lost profits resulting from a shortage in
acreage in land defendant sold him. Defendant had promised plaintiff that the land would
support about 300 head of cattle; the trial court found that the acreage as reduced would
still support more than 300 head. The court held that because the parties' expecta-
tion-enough land to support 300 head-was met, plaintiff lost no profits as a result of the
breach. Id. at 74-76, 423 P.2d at 312-13. This result makes sense when the Hadley rule is
viewed as a means of allocating risk. Here, the express promise was a limitation on defen-
dant's liability. For another limitation by contractual provision, see State ex rel. Mountain
States Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Dist. Court, 160 Mont. 443, 503 P.2d 526 (1972). See infra notes
286-88 and accompanying text.
30. Hadley, 9 Ex. at 355-56. The suggestion in the reporter's notes that defendant had
this special knowledge has caused considerable confusion in the application of the rule. See
Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the Law, 4 J. LEGAL
SrUD. 249, 262 n.53 (1975) [hereinafter Danzig).
[Vol. 44
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special circumstances were here never communicated by the plain-
tiffs to the defendants."31 But is it obvious? Surely reasonable
persons could differ as to whether millers generally have spare
millshafts at their disposal.32 Therein lies one of the difficulties in
the application of the Hadley rules: deciding what is a "natural"
consequence and what is not.
The second Hadley rule has been adopted by case law in Mon-
tana,33 but finding the line between damages arising under the first
rule, which have become known as "general" damages, and those
arising under the second rule, which have become known as "spe-
cial" damages,' has proved elusive. For example, in Baden v. Cur-
tiss Breeding Service,3 ' where defendant sold plaintiff defective
bull semen, plaintiff claimed as damages two years' lost calf crops.
The court allowed damages for the loss of the first calf crop. These
losses fell under both rules; they ordinarily followed the use of de-
fective semen, and the parties had reason to foresee them." How-
ever, the court would not award damages for the loss of the second
year's crop. A reasonable person would not foresee the loss of a
second crop as a proximate result of the defective semen. Even
though the loss would indisputably occur without intercession, the
breaching party would expect the plaintiff to take steps to remedy
the situation when he became aware of it. The contemplation of
these steps limits the otherwise "natural" consequences of the
breach.
31. Hadley, 9 Ex. at 356.
32. The judge's determination that the trade practice was "obvious" underscores an-
other aspect of Hadley: what should be a question of fact has been preempted by the judge.
See Danzig, supra note 30, at 254.
33. See Healy v. Ginoff, 69 Mont. 116, 220 P. 539 (1923); Meyers v. Bender, 46 Mont.
497, 129 P. 330 (1913); Smith v. Fergus County, 98 Mont. 377, 39 P.2d 193 (1934).
Curiously, the second rule was originally included in the California Civil Code in 1872
but was deleted in 1874. Whatever the intent of the deletion, the courts continued to read it
into the statute. See McCormick, supra note 18, at 503-04 n.20. The California Civil Code
was the source of what is now MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-311 (1981).
34. The terms are by no means widely accepted. E. A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §
12.14 n.5 (1982) advises that the terms "general" and "special" should be reserved for plead-
ing, with "consequential" being the proper name for substantive liability under the second
Hadley rule. On the other hand, 5 A. CoaIN, CONTRACTS § 1011 at 87 (1964) maintains that
the use of the term "consequential" should be abandoned.
The Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter UCCI has adopted the first rule in MONT.
CODE ANN. § 30-2-714(1) (1981) and the second rule, using the term "consequential dam-
ages," in MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-715(2).
"General" and "special" damages are discussed in RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 330
special note following comment e (1932). See infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
35. 380 F. Supp. 243 (1974).
36. Id. at 245.
37. Id.
19831
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Baden illustrates another difficulty in the application of the
rules. The test for application of the second rule is an objective
one.3 8 The issue is not the parties' actual contemplation, but
whether a reasonable person would have foreseen special damages
under the circumstances. 9 Contemplation inferred from the cir-
cumstances may be seen in Garden City Floral Co. v. Hunt,40
where plaintiff hired defendent to erect a new building next to
plaintiff's old building, using a wall of the old building in common.
The contract expressly recited the specifications for excavation, in-
cluding underpinnings for the common wall. When defendant did
not comply with the required specifications, the common wall col-
lapsed. Plaintiff sought damages for the loss of the old building."
The court held that it was reasonably within the contemplation of
the parties that if the wall was not properly underpinned, injury to
the wall might result; and that if the wall collapsed, the entire old
building would be damaged. Even though the parties never dis-
cussed these consequences, the detailed instructions for underpin-
ning that were written into the contract indicated that they were
contemplated. 2
In Richardson v. Crone,"3 the court incorrectly applied a sub-
jective test to the facts before it. Plaintiff agreed to use five com-
bines to harvest defendant's wheat when mature. Plaintiff re-
turned with only one c6mbine four days after receiving defendant's
notice to harvest. Four days after plaintiff began work with the
single combine, a hailstorm damaged the standing wheat. Plaintiff
furnished the other four combines two days after the storm, ten
days later than agreed. In plaintiff's suit for the contract price, de-
fendant counterclaimed, arguing that had plaintiff started with five
combines as agreed, the wheat would have been harvested before
the hail fell. At trial, defendant testified that at the time of con-
tracting she did not expect plaintiff to assume responsibility for
damage to her crops by hail. 44 A majority of the court held that
under the second Hadley rule, it was not within the contemplation
of the parties that plaintiff should pay for any crop losses due to
38. 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1009 (1964).
39. The test has become known as one of "foreseeability" even though that term is not
used in Hadley. Use of the term "foreseeable" is probably more compatible with the objec-
tive test, for it suggests what is able to be foreseen while the term "contemplation" suggests
actual awareness.
40. 126 Mont. 537, 255 P.2d 352 (1953).
41. Id. at 539-40, 255 P.2d at 353-54.
42. Id. at 542, 255 P.2d at 355.
43. 127 Mont. 200, 258 P.2d 970 (1953).
44. Id. at 202-03, 258 P.2d at 971-72.
[Vol. 44
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the weather.4 5 A dissenting opinion found that having the grain
harvested as quickly as possible to avoid the possibility of damage
through storms was within the contemplation of the parties.46 This
opinion was based not on application of an objective test, but on a
finding that defendant's testimony contained an express
communication.
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Richardson ap-
plied a stricter interpretation of the second rule than had been an-
nounced in Hadley. According to Richardson, special damages will
not be awarded unless the parties expressly or impliedly mani-
fested an intent to accept the contract with the special conditions
attached.4 This "tacit agreement" test looks subjectively at the ex-
pressions of the parties rather than objectively at what a reasona-
ble man would have foreseen. This stricter test was adopted by
Justice Holmes as federal law but is not generally followed in the
state courts. '" The better view of Richardson is that a reasonable
person knowing that hail storms were not unlikely, and that five
combines had been specified to get the job done faster, would fore-
see that crop loss from a storm is likely to occur if performance is
substantially delayed.'"
In Hein v. Fox, 0 plaintiff paid defendant $1650 to drill a well
that would provide a constant flow of water. Failing after two at-
tempts to strike water, defendant ended all further drilling. Plain-
tiff, who had received a license to sell grade "A" milk on the
strength of the well promised by defendant, lost the license. In ad-
dition to $1650 general damages, plaintiff pleaded special damages
of $1000 resulting from loss of the license and loss of water for
domestic purposes. The jury awarded total damages of $1000.51
Apparently no evidence was offered to show that defendant knew
or had reason to know that the well was needed to retain the milk
license. While the court did not explain how the $1000 award was
calculated, presumably it was restitution for the value of the par-
tially completed well and not special damages. It would not be rea-
sonable to expect the defendant to foresee this loss under the cir-
45. Id. at 203-04, 258 P.2d at 972.
46. Id. at 205, 258 P.2d at 973.
47. Id. at 203-04, 209-10, 258 P.2d at 972, 975.
48. Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540 (1903). Corbin expresses
disapproval of the strict test at 5 A. CoRBIN, COrM ACTS § 1010 (1964).
49. While Hadley framed the rule in terms of the contemplation of the parties at the
time of contracting, the issue is the contemplation of the breaching party. 5 A. ComBI,
CoNTRrCTs § 1007 (1964).
50. 126 Mont. 514, 254 P.2d 1076 (1953).
51. Id. at 519, 254 P.2d at 1079.
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cumstances. If plaintiff had communicated these facts to
defendant, then defendant might have been held liable for the spe-
cial damages arising from the breach.
Not only is it difficult for judges to apply the rules on a case
by case basis, but it is also necessary for attorneys to recognize the
classification of damages for purposes of pleading. In Purington v.
Sound West, the court explained the distinction: "[S]pecial dam-
ages are the natural but not necessary result of the wrong or
breach; whereas general damages are damages the law would im-
pute as the natural, necessary and logical consequence of the
wrong or breach."' Here, plaintiff, a professional musician,
claimed losses resulting from the purchase of a defective sound
system from defendant. The district court awarded damages for
the purchase price and for loss of wages, use, and reputation. The
supreme court reversed as to all but the purchase price, holding
that the other losses were not general damages but special dam-
ages." Special damages must be specifically pleaded under Rule
9(g) of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure: "When items of spe-
cial damage are claimed, they shall be specifically stated." The
rule is sensible, for parties may be taken by surprise if damages are
awarded for losses they did not contemplate, especially where, as
in Purington, the damages are awarded on default. "Special dam-
age," however, is not defined in the statute. An attorney seeking
damages under the second Hadley rule would be wise to specifi-
cally state all items of loss in the pleadings.
In the Annotations, Dean Leaphart observed that "[m]any of
the decisions seem to draw a different line between 'general' and
'special' damages than would the framers of [the Restatement] if
they were distinguishing them."" Comment b to section 351 of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts notes that the terms are often
misleading and are not necessary for the purposes of the rule as
presently incorporated in the Restatement.' The terms will never-
52. 173 Mont. 106, 566 P.2d 795 (1977).
53. Id. at 111-12, 566 P.2d at 798 (citation omitted).
54. Id. at 111, 566 P.2d at 798.
55. ANNOTATIONS, supra note 2, § 330, at 174.
56. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRACTs § 351 (1981) provides:
1) Damages are not recoverable for loss that the party in breach did not have
reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach when the contract was made.
2) Loss may be foreseeable as a probable result of a breach because it follows
from the breach;
a) in the ordinary course of events, or
b) as a result of special circumstances, beyond the ordinary course of
events, that the party in breach had reason to know.
3) A court may limit damages for foreseeable loss by excluding recovery for
[Vol. 44
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theless continue to be used in practice. It is the concepts rather
than the terms that will undoubtedly continue to cause as much
difficulty as they did at the time of Dean Leaphart's observation.
III. CERTAINTY
A plaintiff seeking to recover expectancy damages must estab-
lish not only the fact of damage but also the amount of damage
with reasonable certainty.58 Montana has codified the certainty
rule in the second sentence of section 27-1-311 of the Montana
Code Annotated: "Damages which are not clearly ascertainable in
both their nature and origin cannot be recovered for a breach of
contract."
The requirement of an ascertainable "origin" means that
plaintiff must prove that the loss is the result of the breach. In
Rogers v. Relyea,59 plaintiff claimed defendant drove off a poten-
tial investor, preventing plaintiff's development of a mine. Plaintiff
claimed as losses the profits he would have earned had the mine
been developed. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's hold-
ing that plaintiff's claim was too speculative." Another investor
might have expressed interest in the mine or the first investor
might have decided not to invest in the mine regardless of defen-
dant's acts.
In addition to proving the cause of the loss, plaintiffs must
also prove with certainty that they were damaged. 1 In Brown v.
First Federal Saving and Loan Association of Great Falls,6 2 plain-
tiff borrowers alleged that defendant lender had breached a con-
loss of profits, by allowing recovery only for loss incurred in reliance, or otherwise
if it concludes that in the circumstances justice so requires in order to avoid dis-
proportionate compensation.
57. McCormick approves of the flexibility of the doctrine as facilitating 'commercial
enterprise: "[T]his plastic principle generally proves adequate, in the hands of skillful trial
and appellate judges, to prevent the recovery for breach of contract of damages beyond the
standardized range, whenever such recovery seems unjust or unduly burdensome to business
enterprise." McCormick, supra note 18, at 510. This view accords with the thesis that the
Hadley decision was "a judicial invention in an age of industrial invention." Danzig, supra
note 30, at 250. Danzig would probably view McCormick's observation as naive, for he sees
Hadley as irrelevant to the modern commercial enterprise that limits its liability through
contractual limitations and self-insurance. Id. at 280-81.
58. ANNOTATIONS, supra note 2, § 331; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNRACTs §§ 348,
352 (1981).
59. - Mont. -, 601 P.2d 37 (1979).
60. Id. at -, 601 P.2d at 42.
61. In the absence of proof of loss, nominal damages may be awarded on account of
the breach. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-204 (1981). See ANNOTATIONS, supra note 2, § 328;
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 346 (1981).
62. 154 Mont. 79, 460 P.2d 97 (1969).
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struction loan agreement by disbursing money to a contractor who
had performed work on their house and then skipped town. Be-
cause the contractor had actually performed and plaintiffs did not
allege that the performance was defective, plaintiffs failed to prove
that any loss resulted from the lender's acts."3
Once the cause and existence of damage have been estab-
lished, the apparently stringent statutory requirement of a clearly
ascertainable "nature" has been considerably eased in application.
Recovery will not be denied where damages are difficult to ascer-
tain as long as they are reasonably certain.6 4 The issue becomes
one of proof: whether the evidence offered is "sufficient to afford a
reasonable basis for determining the specific amount awarded." 5
Such a guideline is extremely flexible, making the outcome in a
given fact situation largely unpredictable.
In Smith v. Zepp,66 plaintiff sold defendant a gold mine on a
contract for deed with the provision that defendant would mine
300 yards of material each working day and pay plaintiff royalties
from the net mining profits. After one month, during which he
mined only thirty to forty yards per day and recovered only one
ounce of gold, defendant ceased operations. Plaintiff claimed de-
fault and forfeiture. The court held that this default did not trig-
ger the contract's forfeiture provision. The court found that the
proper measure of damages was the amount that plaintiff would
have received had defendant mined 300 yards per day.67 The fact
that the damages were difficult to ascertain would not deprive
plaintiff of a recovery as long as he could prove them with reasona-
ble certainty.6s The court stated that to prove reasonable certainty,
a plaintiff must provide: "'[a] reasonable basis for computation
and the best evidence obtainable under the circumstances and
which will enable [the judge] to arrive at a reasonably close esti-
mate of the loss . .. ' "69 The court suggested that such evidence
might include the testimony of geologists and geophysicists who
had tested the mine's soil, the history of the mine, the cost of min-
ing 300 yards per day, and the value of the noble metals in the soil
63. Id. at 88-89, 460 P.2d at 102.
64. Brown v. Homestake Exploration Corp., 98 Mont. 305, 337, 39 P.2d 168, 178
(1934). A few courts have gone further, taking the view that it is only the "probability" and
not the "amount" of damag3 that must be proven with reasonable certainty. See Locke v.
United States, 283 F.2d 521, 524 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
65. Cremer v. Cremer Rodeo Land and Livestock Co., - Mont .... 627 P.2d
1199, 1202 (1981).
66. 173 Mont. 358, 567 P.2d 923 (1977).
67. Id. at 370, 567 P.2d at 929.
68. Id. at 370, 567 P.2d at 930.
69. Id. (quoting Brown, 98 Mont. at 337, 39 P.2d at 179).
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during the time of the default."'
In Sikorski v. Olin, 1 plaintiff, a sales representative, testified
as to commissions he would have received but for defendant's
breach. The court implied that the evidence was speculative, but
held that because defendant's attorney had not objected at trial,
the matter could not be raised for the first time on appeal. The
jury, therefore, had some evidence on which it could base its ver-
dict: "[Any award of damages is necessarily grounded to some de-
gree, upon conjecture and surmise. However, the question of dam-
ages is clearly to be determined by the intelligence and common
sense of the jury."' 2 The result appears erroneous, for certainty is a
substantive rather than an evidentiary rule.73 The evidence should
have been excluded even in the absence of objection. On the other
hand, courts may relax the rules when dealing with agents' com-
missions, for the employer knows that it will be difficult for the
discharged agent to prove the amount of lost earnings.74 In such a
case of competing considerations, the court may well resort to the
fundamental principle that doubts should be resolved against the
wrongdoer.75
IV. LOST PROFITS
Damages for lost profits pose little problem when the profits
are the object of the contract itself.7' If a contractor agrees to per-
form work for $11,000, of which $10,000 is for labor and materials
and $1000 is profit, the damages for breach by the owner will be
the lost profit of $1000." In this situation, the lost profits are gen-
eral damages that necessarily result from the breach and do not
70. Smith, 173 Mont. at 370, 567 P.2d at 930.
71. 174 Mont. 107, 568 P.2d 571 (1977).
72. Id. at 113, 568 P.2d at 574.
73. 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1022 (1964).
74. See cases discussed in 5 A. CoRBN, CoTrRACTS § 1025 (1964).
75. Id. at § 1020. In Olson v. Carter, 175 Mont. 105, 572 P.2d 1238 (1977), decided a
few months after Sikorski, the court reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
damage award. The court remanded the case for a determination of damages where there
was a contradiction in the evidence, even though there was evidence to support the verdict.
Id. at 108-10, 572 P.2d at 1240-41. In Olson the court was sitting without a jury. It is likely
that a jury would have been given wider latitude to determine the facts. 5 A. CoRmI, CON-
TRACTS § 1022 (1964). The court also found that attorneys' fees were improperly computed.
Olson, 175 Mont. at 110-11, 572 P.2d at 1241. See infra text accompanying notes 311-19.
76. The term "lost profits" may be misleading. The plaintiff is claiming not a subtrac-
tion from wealth but, under the expectancy theory, the gains plaintiff would have made on
the transaction. See generally 5 A. CoRsN, CONRACTS § 1022 (1969).
77. See A. T. Klemens & Son v. Reber Plumbing and Heating Co., 139 Mont. 115, 360
P.2d 1005 (1961).
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have to be specially pleaded.78 The situation becomes more com-
plex when plaintiff claims more than the profit that would have
resulted from performance. Such additional damages include lost
profits on subsequent transactions 7  remote consequences, 0 and
future business dealings."s Courts must then wrestle with a chain
of events reminiscent of Poor Richard's adage: "A little neglect
may breed great mischief. . . for want of a nail the shoe was lost;
for want of a shoe the horse was lost; and for want of a horse the
rider was lost. 8 2 To decide how much of the mischief the defen-
dant is responsible for, the Hadley rule and the rule that specula-
tive and uncertain profitsss may not be recovered as damages are
carefully applied.
In Stensvad v. Miners and Merchants Bank of Roundup,8 5
plaintiff, operator of a cattle-feeding operation, sought profits al-
legedly lost when defendant bank breached a contract to continue
financing the operation. The court stated the rules for the recovery
of lost profits:
Damages for loss of profits may be awarded if not speculative.
The rule that prohibits speculative profits does not apply to un-
certainty as to the amount of such profits but to uncertainty or
speculation as to whether the loss of profits is the result of the
wrong and whether such profit would have been derived at all.
Once liability is shown, that is the certainty that the damages are
caused by the breach, then loss of profits on a reasonable basis for
computation and the best evidence available under the circum-
78. Green v. Wolff, 140 Mont. 413, 372 P.2d 427 (1962).
79. For example, profits lost on a contract which would have used the undelivered
article were claimed in Hall v. Advance-Rumley Thresher Co., 65 Mont. 566, 212 P. 290
(1923). See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
80. For example, profits lost on a dairy business were claimed for failure to drill a well
in Hein v. Fox, 126 Mont. 514, 254 P.2d 1076 (1953). See supra notes 50-51 and accompany-
ing text.
81. For example, profits lost in future years were claimed in Lass v. Montana State
Highway Comm'n., 157 Mont. 121, 483 P.2d 699 (1971). See infra notes 112-15 and accom-
panying text.
82. B. FRANKLIN, POOR RicHARD'S ALMANAC (1758). The adage was taken further in
Cain v. Vollmer, 19 Idaho 163, 112 P. 686 (1910), where plaintiff racehorse owner sought
damages for purses he might have won in races he might have entered if the rider had not
been injured-not by a lost nail-but by defendant's dog. It was a long shot and he lost.
83. It should be borne in mind that it is not the profits that are speculative or uncer-
tain; it is the evidence introduced to prove them. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying
text.
84. In theory, the tests are separate; whether the loss was foreseeable being applied at
the time of contracting and whether the damages are ascertainable being applied at the time
of trial. On occasion, courts have merged the tests into one of whether at the time of con-
tracting the parties contemplated that profits were necessarily certain to occur. See Archer-
Daniels-Midland Co. v. Paull, 293 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1961).
85. - Mont. -, 640 P.2d 1303 (1982).
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stances will support a reasonably close estimate of the loss by a
District Court. But no damages are recoverable which are not
clearly ascertainable both in nature and origin, and only profits
which are reasonably certain may be awarded.8 6
In other words, once a plaintiff shows damage as a result of the
breach, courts relax the uncertainty doctrine, requiring proof of
lost profits that varies with the circumstances. In Stensvad, the
court held that the record did not establish with reasonable cer-
tainty that the breach caused profits to be lost or that the business
was profitable at all.88 While the court characterized the damages
as "speculative,"89 it would be more accurate to say that insuffi-
cient evidence was offered to prove that profits would have been
made but for the breach. Because plaintiff failed to clear that hur-
dle, he never reached the second: whether the estimate of the dam-
ages was reasonable.
In Bos v. Dolajak,90 the court affirmed an award of damages
for the loss of use of a silo, erection of which was delayed by defen-
dants.91 These damages probably fell under the second Hadley
rule. The court alluded to the requirement that special damages
must have been within the contemplation of the parties but need
not have been actually agreed to 92 when it noted that defendant
Dolajak was "aware . ..of the damages which would result from
loss of use of the silo as he also owns and operates a dairy farm in
North Dakota." 93 The computation of those damages, however, was
not discussed in the opinion. They could have been the rental
value or lost profits on crops. In Havre Daily News, Inc. v. Flora,94
the court held that the measure of damages for breach of a restric-
tive covenant is the total profits lost as a result of the breach. The
aggrieved party requested $500 per month for the life of the cove-
nant, but since he offered no proof of lost profits, the court made
no award.
In Lovely v. Burroughs Corp.,95 plaintiff claimed that defen-
dant's faulty computer damaged his accounting business at two lo-
cations. The trial court calculated the damages on the basis of
86. Id. at -, 640 P.2d at 1310 (citations omitted).
87. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
88. Stensvad, - Mont. at -, 640 P.2d at 1310.
89. Id.
90. 167 Mont. 1, 534 P.2d 1258 (1975).
91. See infra text accompanying notes 242-50.
92. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
93. Bos, 167 Mont. at 8, 534 P.2d at 1261-62.
94. 163 Mont. 131, 515 P.2d 673 (1973).
95. 165 Mont. 209, 527 P.2d 557 (1974).
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losses from the sale of the businesses." The damage award was
sustained with respect to one business, where the cause, origin, and
nature of the damage was clear. The business had been in opera-
tion for only two years and the computer had been purchased to
assist with that business. 7 But the court dismissed as speculative
an award for damage to the other business which was based on
expert testimony as to the difference between the actual gross and
the projected gross without the computer." Damages for lost prof-
its cannot be based on gross income, for profits cannot be com-
puted without consideration of costs as well.9' Proof was similarly
inadequate in Credit Counsellors, Inc. v. Jones.100 Defendant,
claiming loss of motel business due to faulty heaters, attempted to
prove losses through his tax returns for the four years of operation
with the heaters and the two years after he removed them. The
trial court allowed the loss for the first year but not for subsequent
years because of a failure to mitigate.101 Citing Lovely, the supreme
court without discussion held that the loss figure was "too specula-
tive and too remote." 10 1 The result is correct, for there were many
variables other than the heaters in the business. Significantly, de-
fendant did not offer the tax returns for the years before the heat-
ers were installed. Perhaps it was a new business for which no re-
cord of profit could be established.108
There are many Montana cases involving proof of profits lost
on crops.10 4 In Agrilease v. Gray,0 5 where defendant lost most of
two years' hay crop because of plaintiffs failure to install an irriga-
tion system, the trial court awarded the gross value of the crops.
The supreme court reversed, holding that only the net value could
be recovered. The gross value was estimated on the basis of crops
96. Id. at 216, 527 P.2d at 561.
97. Id. at 217, 527 P.2d at 562.
98. Id. at 217-18, 527 P.2d at 562.
99. Goetschius v. Losich, 137 Mont. 465, 353 P.2d 87 (1960). The rule that gross in-
come does not provide lost profits was not followed in one tort case, McCollum v. O'Neil,
128 Mont. 584, 281 P.2d 493 (1954). There the court found that expenses remained the same
regardless of the amount of business done. Any variation was considered circumstantial, for
proof of lost profits does not have to be precise but need only provide the basis for a reason-
able estimate.
100. 169 Mont. 311, 548 P.2d 158 (1976).
101. Id. at 314, 548 P.2d at 160. On the duty to mitigate, see infra text accompanying
notes 122-41.
102. Credit Counsellors, 169 Mont. at 315, 548 P.2d at 160.
103. See Jurcec v. Raznik, 104 Mont. 45, 64 P.2d 1076 (1937).
104. Goetschius, 137 Mont. 465, 353 P.2d 87 (1960). See ANNOTATIONS, supra note 2,
§§ 330, 331.
105. 173 Mont. 151, 566 P.2d 1114 (1977).
[Vol. 44
16
ontana Law Review, Vol. 44 [1983], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol44/iss1/1
CONTRACT DAMAGES
planted but burned up through lack of irrigation. 06 While this may
have resulted in an accurate estimation of the quantity lost, it
failed to take the cost into consideration.
Where the breach causes total loss of the crop, it is more diffi-
cult to estimate the quantity lost. One method of estimating gross
losses is use of the records of prior years.10 7 In Smith v. Fergus
County,'08 defendant unsuccessfully claimed it was error to admit
testimony of the experience of other farms in the vicinity during
the years in question instead of the experience of the land in ques-
tion during prior years. The court held that profits from farming
were reasonably certain when evidenced by the value of matured
crops of like kind in the same period in the same vicinity under
substantially similar conditions.10 9
Damages for loss of future profits of a business may be
awarded if the evidence shows that the loss is caused by the breach
and there is a basis for estimating future losses. In Zook Bros. Con-
struction Co. v. State,"' plaintiff claimed that losses on the liti-
gated project forced it to sell equipment which caused it to lose
profits in future years. The supreme court affirmed denial of those
alleged damages as "vague and speculative.""' But in Laas v.
Montana State Highway Commission,"2 the court affirmed an
award of future profits for three years that were lost because losses
on the litigated project caused plaintiff to lose its bonding capac-
ity. The court found that under the Hadley rule, the loss of bond-
ing capacity was foreseeable and likely to result from breach."13
While these damages could not be estimated with certainty, the
court cited Corbin approvingly for the proposition that the defen-
dant as wrongdoer should not escape liablity "if there is any rea-
sonable way in which the amount that he should pay as damages
can be determined.""14 The court was impressed with the proof of-
fered, which included: (1) a showing that plaintiff had made a
106. Id. at 153-54, 566 P.2d at 1115.
107. In Blaustein v. Pincus, 47 Mont. 202, 131 P. 1064 (1913), the court based antici-
pated profits of an established business on past experience. Cf. Jurcec v. Raznik, 104 Mont.
45, 64 P.2d 1076 (1937).
108. 98 Mont. 377, 39 P.2d 193 (1934).
109. Id. at 385-86, 39 P.2d at 195. In Jurcec, 104 Mont. at 51, 64 P.2d at 1078, where a
new rooming house business would have been operated a few blocks from the old one, the
court held it was error to admit proof of profits that might have been made from a new
business in a new and untried location.
110. 171 Mont. 64, 556 P.2d 911 (1976).
111. Id. at 76, 556 P.2d at 918.
112. 157 Mont. 121, 483 P.2d 699 (1971).
113. Id. at 131, 483 P.2d at 704.
114. Id. at 130-31, 483 P.2d at 704 (citing 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1029 (1964)).
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profit on every job for twenty-two years, (2) an analysis by ac-
countants for each side, and (3) a limitation of three years on the
losses claimed by plaintiff.11 5 This kind of proof and limitation was
apparently lacking in Zook Bros.
Lost profits on a going business were also allowed in Nevin v.
County of Silver Bow," 6 where defendant wrongfully terminated
plaintiffs' five-year restaurant lease.1 7 In addition to lost profits of
$5000 per year, the trial court sitting without a jury awarded $5000
for loss of good will. While this award was not specifically dis-
cussed by the court, it appears erroneous. Good will was not de-
fined in the case, but is defined in section 30-13-121 of the Mon-
tana Code Annotated as "the expectation of continued public
patronage.""' The trial court found that plaintiffs had established
good will "from which plaintiffs could reasonably have enjoyed
continued profitable operation."" In this context, the loss of good
will is indistinguishable from the loss of profits, for the $5000 per
year lost profits presumably took "continued public patronage"
into account.2 0 The error was immaterial, however, for the trial
court found that the lost profit was $12,000 per year but awarded
only $5000.121 The additional $5000 for good will was well within
the evidence of lost profits.
V. AVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES
While an aggrieved plaintiff's expectation damages include
both the gains prevented and the losses suffered because of defen-
dant's breach, a plaintiff cannot recover those losses which he or
she "could have avoided without undue risk, burden, or humilia-
tion. 1 22 Likewise, if the breach presented an opportunity that
plaintiff could have grasped by reasonable effort, and without un-
115. Id. at 129-30, 483 P.2d at 703.
116. 172 Mont. 501, 565 P.2d 314 (1972).
117. See also Cruse v. Clawson, 137 Mont. 439, 352 P.2d 989 (1960) (where a similar
award was made in a tort action).
118. See also Spheeris v. Spheeris, 37 Wis. 2d 497, 504-05, 155 N.W.2d 130, 135
(1967).
119. Nevin, 172 Mont. at 507, 565 P.2d at 317.
120. In Sol-O-Lite Laminating Corp. v. Allen, 223 Or. 80, 92, 353 P.2d 843, 849 (1960),
the court held that there was a duplication of damage claims where a party who received
defective plastic claimed lost profits on items "he would have sold had his customers not
become disgusted with him" in addition to loss of good will. Cf. Baldwin v. Stuber, -
Mont. -, 610 P.2d 160 (1980), in which the value of good will was allowed in quantum
meruit where plaintiff's good will was transferred to defendant under a void contract.
121. Nevin, 172 Mont. at 507, 565 P.2d at 317-18.
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTCrACrS § 350 (1981). See, e.g., Spackman v. Ralph
M. Parsons Co., 169 Mont. 141, 545 P.2d 665 (1976), and infra text accompanying notes 230-
41.
[Vol. 44
18
ontana Law Review, Vol. 44 [1983], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol44/iss1/1
1983] CONTRACT DAMAGES
due risk, expense or humiliation, the gains plaintiff could have
made are deducted from the damages.12 This principle is called
either the doctrine of "avoidable consequences" or the "duty to
mitigate."' 24 Montana has not codified the avoidable consequences
doctrine' but has adopted it in case law.1
2 6
The doctrine requires only a reasonable effort to mitigate
damages. It does not require that plaintiff use every means possi-
ble nor does it require that the efforts be successful.2 7 In Business
Finance Co. v. Red Barn, Inc., 28 plaintiff repossessed equipment
leased to defendant and sued on the contract. Defendant claimed
plaintiff failed to mitigate its damages because the repossession
took place seventeen months after defendant's default. The court
found that where plaintiff sent frequent notices of default to de-
fendant, even though plaintiff was not successful in obtaining pay-
ments from defendant, the efforts were reasonable under the cir-
cumstances and did not "unnecessarily enlarge damages caused by
the default." I "
In McEwen v. Big Sky of Montana, Inc., 30 plaintiff leased a
truck to defendant, who agreed to repair it before returning it.
Plaintiff was not successful in getting defendant to repair the truck
and return it for almost two years. Plaintiff sued to recover the
123. 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1039 (1964). It follows that opportunities not presented
by the breach are not deducted from damages. For example, if a teacher is wrongfully dis-
charged from a day school job paying $15,000 per year and is immediately offered a night
school job paying $13,000 per year, the gain from the second job is not deducted if the
teacher could have performed both jobs prior to the breach. See infra notes 167-68 and
accompanying text.
124. The term "duty to mitigate" is misleading, for there is no affirmative obligation
to act. Whether plaintiffs actually reduce their losses or increase their gains will not affect
their recovery. In the example above, if the discharged teacher were immediately offered a
comparable day school job paying $13,000 per year, the damages are exactly the
same-$2000-whether the teacher takes the second job or not. While it might be worth the
effort to avoid reference to the "duty," its use is ingrained among attorneys and judges.
125. See ANNOTATIONS, supra note 2, §§ 335, 336; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS §§ 347, 350 (1981). Mitigation is not expressly found in the UCC, but may be im-
plied from the obligation of good faith in MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-1-203 (1981) and applied to
the "cover" rule of MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-712 (1981) and to the limitation on consequen-
tial damages in MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-715 (1981).
126. Applications of the doctrine of avoidable consequences may be seen in Wyatt v.
School Dist., 148 Mont. 85, 417 P.2d 221 (1966) (employment agreement); Credit Counsel-
lors, Inc. v. Jones, 169 Mont. 311, 548 P.2d 158 (1976) (defective goods); Martel Constr., Inc.
v. Gleason Equip., Inc., 166 Mont. 479, 534 P.2d 883 (1975) (late delivery of goods); Harring-
ton v. Holiday Rambler Corp., 176 Mont. 37, 575 P.2d 578 (1978) (defective trailer home).
127. 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1039 (1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
350(2) (1981).
128. 163 Mont. 263, 517 P.2d 383 (1973).
129. Id. at 267-68, 517 P.2d at 384.
130. 169 Mont. 141, 545 P.2d 665 (1976).
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truck and lease payments. The district court held that when plain-
tiff refused delivery of the unrepaired truck, he had abandoned it
and failed to mitigate his loss. The supreme court reversed, find-
ing that plaintiff had not intended to abandon the truck but to
have it repaired by defendant."' 1 Plaintiff made sufficient efforts to
demand the repair and hasten return of his truck when he con-
tacted defendant twice and when he retained a lawyer who more
than once contacted defendant.13 2 These acts met the "reasonable
effort" standard.
The doctrine of avoidable consequences does not require
plaintiffs to mitigate damages if in so doing they place themselves
in situations involving risk or unreasonable expense.1 3  In
Spackman v. Ralph M. Parsons Co.,134 a tort case which has been
influential in contract disputes,3 the court stated that the test for
determining the limits of the duty to mitigate31 is: "What would
an ordinarily prudent person be expected to do if capable, under
the circumstances?' ' 1 Here, plaintiff was not required to wade
into raw sewage which flooded his motel in order to save his per-
sonal property and thus mitigate his losses."3 8
The burden of proving avoidable consequences is borne by the
party who breached the contract. 39 In A. T. Klemens & Son v.
Reber Plumbing and Heating Co.,140 where plaintiff claimed that
defendant breached an agreement to use plaintiff as a subcontrac-
tor, defendant argued that it was up to plaintiff to offer evidence
of the savings that resulted from the breach. The court held that
the burden was on the defendant, which failed to carry the burden
when it offered no proof on the subject.14'
131. Id. at 148, 545 P.2d at 669.
132. Id. at 149, 545 P.2d at 669.
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350, comment g (1981).
134. 147 Mont. 500, 414 P.2d 918 (1966).
135. See infra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
136. The court erroneously characterized the duty as a "positive" one. See supra note
124.
137. Spackman, 147 Mont. at 505, 414 P.2d at 921 (citation omitted).
138. Id.
139. 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1039, at 251 (1964). See also McEwen, 169 Mont. at
148-49, 545 P.2d at 669, where the court held that damages would not be reduced when
defendant had not offered substantial credible evidence that plaintiff failed to mitigate.
140. 139 Mont. 115, 360 P.2d 1005 (1961).
141. Id. at 125, 360 P.2d at 1010.
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VI. DAMAGES IN PARTICULAR ACTIONS
A. Employment Agreements
A wrongfully discharged employee is entitled to his or her ex-
pectancy: the salary the employee would have earned during the
remainder of the term less amounts actually earned or that could
have been earned.1 42 This latter factor takes into account the em-
ployee's duty to mitigate damages.1 43
In the leading Montana case on breach of an employment
agreement, Wyatt v. School District No. 104, Fergus County,"
plaintiff moved from Colorado to Lewistown after accepting a
teaching position paying $3600 per year plus rent-free living
quarters. Wrongfully discharged after approximately one month,
she incurred expenses seeking other work, eventually obtaining
part-time employment as a substitute teacher in Billings.
The court properly denied plaintiff's claim for the expense of
moving from Colorado to Montana. She would have incurred that
expense even if defendant had performed, so reimbursement was
not required to satisfy the expectancy goal of putting her in the
position she would have been in had defendant performed.' 4 The
court had difficulty, however, justifying damages for the loss of liv-
ing quarters and for the expenses of seeking new employment. De-
fendant urged the court to limit the damages to the lost salary
under what is now section 27-1-312 of the Montana Code Anno-
tated: "The detriment caused by the breach of an obligation to pay
money only is deemed to be the amount due by the terms of the
obligation, with interest thereon."
Finding no cases construing the statute or its California coun-
terpart, the court drew on a California case construing the counter-
part of what is now section 27-1-315 of the Montana Code Anno-
tated.1 46 The California Supreme Court held that in an action for
breach of an agreement to purchase real estate, expenses in addi-
tion to those provided in the statute could be recovered.147 The
Montana court then cited Orford v. Topp,148 for the proposition
that the specific statutes applicable to determine the damages for
142. 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1095 (1964). See also Miller v. Yellowstone Irr. Dist.,
91 Mont. 538, 9 P.2d 795 (1932).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 122-41.
144. 148 Mont. 83, 417 P.2d 221 (1966).
145. Id. at 91, 417 P.2d at 225.
146. See infra text accompanying notes 213-18.
147. Wyatt, 148 Mont. at 88, 417 P.2d at 223-24 (citing Royer v. Carter, 37 Cal. 2d
544, 233 P.2d 539 (1951)).
148. 136 Mont. 227, 346 P.2d 566 (1959).
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breach of an agreement to convey real property "must be read in
light of [now section 27-1-311 of the Montana Code Annotated],
the purpose of which is to compensate an aggrieved party for the
loss he sustains. ' 149 In Wyatt, the court turned this dicta from a
case strictly limiting damages into a broad statement of "its philos-
ophy on damages":
In effect, what the court has said is that the statutes are to be
regarded as guides in the estimation of damages to be recovered,
and that the respondent should receive a sum which, when added
to the benefits already received under the contract, will give her
an economic status identical to that which she would have en-
joyed had the contract been performed. 5"
This statement of basic expectancy principles is correct and lauda-
ble, but overly broad for purposes of this case, which could have
been decided in a less roundabout fashion. The present section 27-
1-312 cited by defendant could have been distinguished as appro-
priate for an obligation such as a promissory note rather than a
promise to pay for services.
The court affirmed the award for the loss of living quarters for
a variety of reasons, but principally as a natural consequence of
the breach which defendant could. reasonably have foreseen plain-
tiff would have to replace on breach.151 It does not seem necessary
to regard the loss as something more than the value of the prom-
ised performance itself. The court might simply have added the
value of the living quarters to the promised cash salary to arrive at
the amount of the expectancy. The issue of whether these damages
were additional to the statutory damages could thus have been
avoided. The expenses incurred in seeking other employment were
allowed as part of plaintiff's successful attempt to mitigate.15 2 In
fact, there is authority for award of those expenses even if no alter-
nate employment is found.1 53
In other cases, the first issue that had to be resolved was
whether the plaintiff was an employee. In McNulty v. Bewley
Corp.,1 54 plaintiffs remained as managers of a restaurant on the
promise of defendant that things would be "made 'right.' ,,155 The
court held that in the absence of an express agreement, the con-
149. Wyatt, 148 Mont. at 89, 417 P.2d at 224.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 89-90, 417 P.2d at 224-25.
152. Id. at 90-91, 417 P.2d at 225.
153. 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1044, at 277 (1964).
154. 182 Mont. 260, 596 P.2d 474 (1979).
155. Id. at 263, 596 P.2d at 475.
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duct of the parties implied a contract which entitled plaintiffs to
reasonable compensation. 1" While the court did not explain how
the damages were measured, it is significant that the finding that
plaintiffs were employees entitled them to recover attorneys' fees
under what is now section 39-3-214.157
In Cartwright v. Joyce,1 58 plaintiff sued defendant's estate for
the reasonable value of services she had performed for the de-
ceased in the six years preceding the death of the alleged em-
ployer. The court held that there was not an express contract but a
contract implied in fact from the actions of the parties. 59 Signifi-
cantly, attorneys' fees were awarded for the recovery of the
wages."'0 Dissenting, Justice Castles found the evidence "totally
lacking as clear, convincing, strong and satisfactory," 61 which sug-
gests a higher standard of proof than a preponderance. While some
states have adopted a higher standard of proof in cases involving
contracts between relatives,"a it is questionable whether a higher
standard could have been imposed-if such was Justice Castles' in-
tention-in the face of Montana's statutory standard of a prepon-
derance of the evidence in civil cases.16 3 Justice Castles also argued
that even if compensation was properly awarded, the services were
professional services, recovery of which should not entitle plaintiff
156. Id. at 264-66, 596 P.2d at 476-77. See also Keith v. Kottes, 119 Mont. 98, 172
P.2d 306 (1946), in which the court denied recovery where plaintiffs alleged an implied con-
tract at the same time they had an express contract with defendant.
157. McNulty, 182 Mont. at 266, 695 P.2d at 477. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-3-214 (1981)
provides:
(1) Whenever it is necessary for the employee to enter or maintain a suit at
law for the recovery or collection of wages due as provided for by this part, a
resulting judgment must include a reasonable attorney's fee in favor of the suc-
cessful party, to be taxed as part of the costs in the case. (2) Any judgment for the
plaintiff in a proceeding pursuant to this part must include all costs reasonably
incurred in connection with the proceeding, including attorneys' fees.
158. 155 Mont. 478, 473 P.2d 515 (1970).
159. 155 Mont. at 484-85, 473 P.2d at 518-19, citing what is now MONT. CODE ANN. §
28-2-103 (1981), which provides:
A contract is either expressed or implied. An express contract is one the terms of
which are stated in words. An implied contract is one the existence and terms of
which are manifested by conduct.
160. 155 Mont. at 490-91, 473 P.2d at 521-22. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-3-214(1)
(1981), supra note 160.
161. Cartwright, 155 Mont. at 493, 473 P.2d at 523.
162. E.g., Woods v. Fifth-Third Union Trust Co., 54 Ohio App. 303, 6 N.E.2d 987
(1936).
163. MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-403(1) (1981) provides:
The jury is to be instructed by the court on all proper occasions: (1) that in civil
cases the affirmative of the issue must be proved, and when the evidence is contra-
dictory, the decision must be made according to the preponderance of the
evidence. . ..
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to attorneys' fees. 1 4
B. Construction Contracts'6
1. Breach by the Owner
If the owner breaches the contract before the contractor has
begun performance, damages are simply the expectancy: the profit
the contractor would have made had there been performance. In A.
T. Klemens & Son v. Reber Plumbing and Heating Co.,'16 the
court corrected a common mathematical error made in computing
profit. If the contract amount is $11,000 and a reasonable profit is
ten percent, the profit is not $1100 (ten percent of $11,000). This
computation gives the contractor profit on a profit. The contract
amount is the cost of materials and labor plus a profit computed
on the cost. In the example of the $11,000 contract, the cost of
materials and labor is $10,000 and the profit is $1000 (ten percent
of $10,000). In Klemens, the court also held that because defen-
dant failed to offer proof on the subject, it was not entitled to a
deduction on account of plaintiff's failure to mitigate.1 6 7 While the
result is correct, the doctrine of avoidable consequences is gener-
ally not applied to construction contracts, on the theory that by
subcontracting, a contractor can perform more than one contract
at the same time.'68
At the other end of the scale, when performance is completed,
the contractor is entitled to no more than the contract amount.'69
It is a frequently disputed question of fact whether performance
has been completed. Often determination of this question is left to
164. Cartwright, 155 Mont. at 493, 473 P.2d at 523.
165. See ANNOTATIONS, supra note 2, § 346; RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§
347, 348 (1981).
166. 139 Mont. 115, 360 P.2d 1005 (1901).
167. Id. at 125, 360 P.2d at 1010. See supra text accompanying notes 139-41.
168. See, e.g., M & R Contractors & Builders, Inc. v. Michael, 215 Md. 340, 354-56,
138 A.2d 350, 358 (1958).
169. 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1110 (1964); Myers v. Bender, 46 Mont. 497, 129 P. 330
(1913).
An interesting question arises when plaintiff's full performance is prevented by defen-
dant. Plaintiff may recover in quantum meruit, but is the recovery limited by the contract
price? The majority rule is that the contract price is not a limit. See Palmer, The Contract
Price as a Limit on Restitution for Defendant's Breach, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 264, 269-71 (1959).
Montana appears to follow the minority rule that the agreed price limits the quantum me-
ruit. Puetz v. Carlson, 139 Mont. 373, 364 P.2d 742 (1961), Puetz was distinguished in
DeFord v. Wansink, 152 Mont. 487, 452 P.2d 73 (1969), where plaintiff received more than
the pro-rated contract price when defendant breached a three-year cattle-sharing contract
after eighteen months. In DeFord, the contract was not divisible, so plaintiff had performed
more than half the value of the promised performance during the first half of the contract
term.
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the owner or the architect and manifested by the issuance of a cer-
tificate for payment. An issue then arises as to the standard em-
ployed by the issuing party. In Figgins v. Stevenson,' 0 an owner
who had the authority to issue the certificate claimed that issuance
was a condition precedent to payment. The court dismissed the
argument curtly: "Under that argument, apparently Stevenson
would have us believe that so long as he never issued a certificate
he would not be required to pay. Obviously that is incorrect. 17 1
There is no Montana case that more fully addresses the ques-
tions that can arise in these situations: whether the standard of
satisfaction in a construction contract is objective or subjective;
whether the architect's refusal of a certificate is conclusive. As to
the first question, the majority of states, including California, ap-
ply an objective standard: would a reasonable person have been
satisfied. Even when the subjective standard is applied, the tests
become very similar because the party must act in good faith.172 As
to the second question, an architect is considered a quasi-arbitra-
tor whose decision can be attacked on the same grounds as that of
any other arbitrator: only where there is fraud, bad faith, or fail-
ure to exercise honest judgment.17' The contractor in Figgins was
unwise to leave issuance of the certificate up to the owner. Never-
theless, this alone would not avoid the contractual provision. The
court might have included another step in its analysis by recogniz-
ing that since the contractor did complete the work in a satisfac-
tory manner,17 4 the owner's refusal to issue the certificate was
incorrect.
In some cases, completion of the contract may be delayed by
the owner. In two Montana cases, the state caused delay in the
performance of highway construction contracts by its failure to ob-
tain rights-of-way. In Laas v. Montana State Highway Commis-
sion,'75 the significant elements of the damage award were the
rental value of equipment idled by the delay and the loss of future
profits.17 6 In Zook Brothers Construction Co. v. State,'77 the dis-
trict court awarded damages of approximately $141,000. The su-
preme court, finding no basis to support the award, modified and
awarded over $1,320,000. The elements of the damage award were
170. 163 Mont. 425, 517 P.2d 735 (1973).
171. Id. at 429, 517 P.2d at 737.
172. See Annot., 44 A.L.R. 2d 1114 (1955).
173. See Annot., 43 A.L.R. 2d 1227 (1955).
174. Figgins, 163 Mont. at 429, 517 P.2d at 737.
175. 157 Mont. 121, 483 P.2d 699 (1971).
176. See supra text accompanying notes 112-15.
177. 171 Mont. 64, 556 P.2d 911 (1976).
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the rental value of the equipment ($613,000), increased perform-
ance costs ($619,000), and lost profits on the contract ($88,000).
The calculation of the performance costs indicates the lack of ex-
actness often found in the computation of damages, for Zook of-
fered at least three methods of determining its loss.17 8 Dissenting,
Justice Haswell would have affirmed the district court decision as
supported by sufficient evidence. The district court had found that
Zook's underestimation of the time for performance was responsi-
ble for most of the loss.17 9
2. Breach by the Contractor
The general rule for defective construction is that the damages
equal the cost of remedying the defect to give the owner the bene-
fit of the bargain. 80 In Kirby v. Kenyon-Noble Lumber Co.,' the
court remanded the matter for a new trial where the district court
used as the measure of damages the difference in market value of
the house as promised and as delivered. 82 The court found no
statutory provision for damages for breach of construction con-
tracts, but noted that under section 27-1-311 of the Montana Code
Annotated, the cost of completion has been equated with the "det-
riment proximately caused" by the breach. a'8
In Haggerty v. Selsco,'5 a contractor installed defective
shower units in a campground. The owner claimed as the measure
178. Id. at 74-75, 556 P.2d at 917. In Bohrer v. Clark, 180 Mont. 233, 890 P.2d 117
(1978), the court held that trial courts may not increase the damages awarded by a jury.
Disapproving as well of the supreme court increasing a trial court award, the court distin-
guished the result in Zook Bros. as applicable only where the case was tried without a jury
and the award was "merely the result of an error in mathematical calculation." Id. at 241,
590 P.2d at 122.
179. Zook Bros., 171 Mont. at 78, 556 P.2d at 919. It follows that no recovery may be
obtained for an unprofitable contract, for there would then be no expectancy.
180. See, e.g., Carriger v. Ballenger, - Mont. -, 628 P.2d 1106 (1981). In Prudential
Fed. Say. & Loan v. McDougall, 173 Mont. 263, 567 P.2d 445 (1977), defendants signed a
note to pay a contractor for the refurbishing of a log home. The refurbishing was unsatisfac-
tory and defendants stopped making payments. Plaintiff received judgment on the note
against defendants, who received judgment against the contractor in a third-party action.
While the value of the performance was not discussed, it must have been worthless if defen-
dants were awarded the difference between what they were promised and what they
received.
181. 171 Mont. 329, 558 P.2d 452 (1976).
182. The district court actually found that the value of the house was reduced "to"
$2085 and awarded that amount as damages. The supreme court held that that award was
not logical. Id. at 333, 558 P.2d at 454. The district court probably applied the correct mea-
sure of damages-the cost of repair-and meant that the value was reduced by $2085.
183. Id. at 332-33, 558 P.2d at 453-54 (citing Mitchell v. Carlson, 132 Mont. 1, 313
P.2d 717 (1957) and Haggerty v. Selsco, 166 Mont. 492, 534 P.2d 874 (1975)).
184. 166 Mont. 492, 534 P.2d 874 (1975).
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of damages the cost of removal and replacement of the showers,
while the contractor claimed the cost of repairing the showers to
bring them up to specification. In a particularly confusing opinion,
the court upheld the application of the latter measure on the ex-
pectancy theory.185 The result was made easier by two factors.
First, the contract provided for a particular brand or its
equivalent. This weakened the owner's argument that he was enti-
tled to a particular brand. Second, the contract provided that a
consulting engineer would "determine all questions as to accept-
able fulfillment of the contract."' 86 At a meeting of the parties and
the engineer, it was agreed that the contractor would attempt to
improve the showers. It was the estimate of the engineer that was
adopted by the trier of fact.18 7 Even in the absence of these factors,
it is likely that the same result would have been reached under the
"economic waste" theory.
The general rule that the damages are equal to the cost of re-
pair is subject to an exception when the cost of repair exceeds the
value of the property. This exception in circumstances involving
economic waste is well-known to insurance adjusters and the Inter-
nal Revenue Service. 88 The principle was well stated by Justice
Cardozo in Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent:8 9 "The owner is entitled
to the money which will permit him to complete, unless the cost of
completion is grossly and unfairly out of proportion to the good to
be attained. When that is true, the measure is the difference in
value." 190 In Jacob & Youngs, a builder installed Cohoes pipe in a
dwelling instead of the Reading pipe called for in the contract.
Cardozo held that because it would be economically wasteful to
tear down the structure to replace the pipe, the correct measure of
damage was the difference in the value of the house with and with-
out the pipe. 19' Because the parties had stipulated that the pipe
was of equal value, the owner had no recovery.
In Chandler v. Madsen,'"I the court held a builder liable for a
defective house under an implied warranty of habitability. The
district court awarded damages of $97,500 for repair of the house.
The supreme court affirmed the award and restored $3200 of a
185. Id. at 500, 534 P.2d at 878. At the beginning of headnote [1], "Plaintiffs" should
read "Defendants."
186. Id. at 496, 534 P.2d at 876.
187. Id.
188. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7.
189. 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889 (1921).
190. Id. at 244, 129 N.E. at 891.
191. Id.
192. - Mont. -, 642 P.2d 1028 (1982).
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$4000 award for temporary rental while repairs were made and an
award of $3487.51 for moving and storage that had been deleted by
the trial court on a post-trial motion."' The purchase price-and
presumably the value-of the house was $90,280. The award makes
no sense under the theory of economic waste. Under that theory,
the damages would be the difference between the value as prom-
ised ($90,280) and the value as delivered. This may have been
only salvage value plus value of the land, but the salvage value in a
new house is probably substantial.
Before dismissing the court's reasoning altogether, it may be
argued that the economic waste theory does not apply in Chandler.
In Jacob & Youngs, because the substituted pipe was of equal
value, replacement would have been absurd. In Haggerty v. Selsco,
the repaired showers were apparently as good as the promised
ones. But in Chandler, substantial replacement was undoubtedly
required. Furthermore, the New York Court of Appeals created an
exception to Jacob & Youngs when the structure is unusable or
unsafe. In Bellizzi v. Huntley Estates,"4 the court ordered a
builder to pay the cost of redoing a driveway where he constructed
it with a dangerous twenty-five percent grade instead of the prom-
ised ten percent grade.
Nevertheless, the fundamental principle behind the doctrine
of economic waste is the prevention of unjust enrichment of the
owner. 19 In Jacob & Youngs, had the owner recovered damages, he
could not reasonably be expected to have used the money to tear
out the offensive pipe. The recovery would be a windfall. In Bel-
lizzi, the payment did not exceed the price of the house and for
their safety and convenience, the owners might reasonably be ex-
pected to make the repairs. If they did not, the resale value of the
house would certainly be diminished. Chandler seems closer to Ja-
cob & Youngs than to Bellizzi. A reasonable owner of the Chandler
property would sell the property for the value of the land and sal-
vage, pocketing much of the damages as windfall. If the economic
waste theory had been applied, recovery would have been limited
to the difference between the value as reflected in the sale price
and the value of the land plus salvage value. After repairs, the
owner would have the expectancy, an accretion to wealth of
$90,280.
193. Id. at -, 642 P.2d at 1034.
194. 3 N.Y.2d 112, 143 N.E.2d 802, 164 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1957).
195. 5 A. CORIN, CONTRACTS § 1090 (1964). See, e.g., Bowes v. Saks & Co., 397 F.2d
113 (7th Cir. 1968).
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C. Real Property
Transactions involving real property are complicated because
the parties often establish the damages by agreement or they seek
alternative remedies such as specific performance or rescission.
This discussion is limited to those transactions which involve the
expectancy doctrine.
1. Breach of an Executory Agreement to Convey Real Property.
If the seller fails to convey real property because of a title
problem, the "English rule" allows the buyer to recover only the
expenses he or she has incurred. The "American rule" allows the
buyer to recover the benefit of the bargain: the difference between
the value of the land and the contract price."s6 Montana has essen-
tially adopted both rules in section 27-1-314 of the Montana Code
Annotated, the "English rule" generally applying and the "Ameri-
can rule" applying when the seller's breach is in bad faith:
The detriment caused by the breach of an agreement to con-
vey an estate in real property is considered to be the price paid
and the expenses properly incurred in examining the title and
preparing the necessary papers, with interest thereon. If the
breach was in bad faith and the agreed price was less than the
value of the estate, the detriment is also considered to include the
difference between the agreed price and the value of the estate at
the time of the breach and the expenses properly incurred in pre-
paring to enter upon the land.
Application of the rule proved perplexing in Orford v. Topp. 7
The facts were simple. Defendant contracted to convey real prop-
erty to plaintiffs for $20,000 and sold it to a third party for
$20,900. Plaintiffs bought other property and offered proof that it
would cost them $2,059.50 to build a two-car garage on the prop-
erty. Instructed under what is now section 27-1-314, the jury found
that the breach was in bad faith and awarded plaintiffs $2,959.50, a
figure arrived at by adding the difference in the sale price to the
cost of the garage.""8 The jury had also been instructed that they
could award damages under what is now section 27-1-305 for the
loss of property which had a "peculiar value" to plaintiffs.' 9 ' Not-
196. 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1097, 1098 (1964).
197. 136 Mont. 227, 346 P.2d 566 (1959).
198. Id. at 229, 346 P.2d at 567.
199. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-305 (1981) provides:
Where a certain property has a peculiar value to a person recovering damages for
deprivation thereof or injury thereto, that may be deemed to be its value against
one who had notice thereof before incurring a liability to damages in respect
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ing that "it is doubtful that this is the type of case where the in-
struction on 'peculiar value' is applicable," the court did not
squarely face this issue, finding no evidence of peculiar value in
this case.200 The court's inclination was probably correct, for the
statute should be reserved for cases such as the loss of an heirloom
or a photograph, where market value is far less significant than
value to the owner.2 1
While the instruction under what is now section 27-1-305 was
error, the remaining instructions still posed a problem. The jury
was instructed under section 17-602 of the Revised Codes of Mon-
tana that "market value" was "the price at which [the buyer]
might have bought an equivalent thing in the market. 2 02 As dis-
cussed above,2 03 the court stated that section 17-602 was not to be
read alone, but in conjunction with what is now section 27-1-314 of
the Montana Code Annotated to compensate the aggrieved party
for the loss. 20
4
But what was the loss: the amount for which seller re-sold the
property or the amount buyer was required to spend to acquire
similar property? The court did not have to face this issue, finding
that the property ultimately purchased was not similar and that
the only proof offered of the value of similar property was the re-
sale for $20,900. Section 17-602 was repealed in 1963.205 This
should make the question easier to resolve today. The actual resale
price is strong evidence of "the value of the estate at the time of
the breach" under section 27-1-314. Even if there is not a sale, the
appraised value would be better evidence than the price of other
property on a market which consists of such non-interchangeable
items as parcels of real estate.2 0 The holding that-in the absence
of liquidated damages or specific performance-plaintiffs were en-
titled to the $900 is correct.
The rule of section 27-1-314 was applied in Stovall v. Watt,0 7
where defendant agreed to convey 960 acres to plaintiffs at twenty
dollars per acre. Defendant sold the property to a third party at
twenty dollars per acre. The trial court found that the breach was
thereof or against a willful wrongdoer.
200. Orford, 136 Mont. at 233-34, 346 P.2d at 569.
201. See, e.g., Florida Pub. Util. Co. v. Wester, 150 Fla. 439, 7 So.2d 788 (1942).
202. Orford, 136 Mont. at 229, 346 P.2d at 567.
203. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
204. Orford, 136 Mont. at 230-31, 346 P.2d at 568.
205. Repeal was in connection with the adoption of the UCC. 1963 Mont. Laws 264 §
10-102. Because the UCC would not apply to this transaction, there is presently no applica-
ble statute.
206. Palladine v. Imperial Valley Farm Lands, 65 Cal. App. 727, 225 P. 291 (1924).
207. - Mont. -, 610 P.2d 164 (1980).
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in bad faith. The actual sale price, while evidence of the market
value, was not presumptive evidence and was rebutted by expert
testimony which showed the value to be thirty dollars per acre.
The measure of damages was the difference between the value as
found by the trial court (960 x $30) and the contract price (960 x
$20), or $9600.208
Dissenting, Justice Sheehy did not find bad faith. He would
nevertheless have left open the possibility of damages under the
theory that section 27-1-314 is not necessarily exclusive but must
be read in the light of section 27-1-311.219 He cited as authority
Wiseman v. Holt.2 10 Wiseman held that what is now section 27-1-
315 of the Montana Code Annotated was not exclusive, but was
subsequently overruled in Whitney v. Bails. 211 Whitney held that
what is now section 27-1-315 is the exclusive measure of damages
for breach of an agreement to purchase real property.
2. Breach of an Executory Agreement to Purchase Real Property
On the surface, the rule in section 27-1-314, seems to be re-
flected in the rule for breach by purchasers set forth in section 27-
1-315: "The detriment caused by the breach of an agreement to
purchase an estate in real property is deemed to be the excess, if
any, of the amount which would have been due to the seller under
the contract over the value of the property to him." If S agreed to
sell property worth $19,000 to P for $20,000 and P breached, the
damages would be $1000, the excess of the contract price over the
value of the property; in other words, the damages are the benefit
of the bargain. This makes sense as long as the contract price ex-
ceeds the value of the property. But the rule has been applied to
sales under contract for deed, where the contract price diminishes
while the value generally appreciates over time.
In Wiseman v. Holt,"2 purchasers under a contract for deed
began demolishing the premises and then defaulted. The trial
court awarded sellers damages for waste, but purchasers claimed
that additional damages were not permissible under what is now
section 27-1-315. The court held that additional damages are per-
missible to give sellers the benefit of the bargain under the general
principles of what is now section 27-1-311 of the Montana Code
208. Id. at -, 610 P.2d at 169-70.
209. Id. at -, 610 P.2d at 171.
210. 163 Mont. 387, 517 P.2d 711 (1973).
211. 172 Mont. 121, 560 P.2d 1344 (1977). See infra notes 216-18 and accompanying
text.
212. 163 Mont. 387, 517 P.2d 711 (1973).
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Annotated. 13
In Wiseman, the court used Royer v. Carter '" as authority for
the proposition that additional expenses have been allowed under
the California equivalent of what is now section 27-1-315. That
case involved not a contract for deed but a sale where the contract
price equalled the market price. Under a strict reading of the stat-
ute, a seller in this position would not recover such expenses as
brokers' fees or fees for the preparation of instruments. To give the
seller the benefit of the bargain, the California Supreme Court al-
lowed recovery of the expenses.21 This holding is far narrower
than the holding in Wiseman, which allowed substantial additional
damages for waste.
Wiseman was specifically overruled as to additional damages
in Whitney v. Bails.216 In Whitney, purchaser under a contract for
deed defaulted and seller claimed damages for waste. The court
held that because the market price at the time of breach exceeded
the contract price, under what is now section 27-1-315, seller was
entitled only to the benefit of the bargain: "The damage done may
be used, as it was here, to reduce the market value of the land but
it may not be used, as urged here, to allow damages where none
would be due under the statutory measure. 2 17 As an example of
the application of Whitney, assume real property worth $70,000
was purchased for $10,000 down and $60,000 on contract, and at
the time of default two years later, the value was $80,000 and
$58,000 remained payable on the contract. There is no excess of
the amount due under the contract over the value of the property,
so there are no damages. In fact, the purchaser would have to de-
stroy over $22,000 worth of value before becoming liable for dam-
ages under the statute.
These cases are variations on a thorny issue: to whom does the
equity belong in a default on a contract for deed? The suggestion
in Whitney seems to be that the seller has an interest only to the
extent of the amount the seller has financed, which would be the
situation under mortgage financing. While no solution is suggested
here, as a first step the court might restrict section 27-1-315 to
agreements breached before partial performance, as in Royer, and
approach contracts for deed as an area with special considerations
213. Id. at 391-92, 517 P.2d at 714 (citing Orford v. Topp, 136 Mont. 227, 346 P.2d 566
(1959) and Wyatt v. School Dist., 148 Mont. 83, 417 P.2d 221 (1956)).
214. 37 Cal. 2d 544, 233 P.2d 539 (1951).
215. Id. at _ 233 P.2d at 543. See also 5 A. CoRIN, CON'mTCTS § 1036 (1964).
216. 172 Mont. 121, 560 P.2d 1344.
217. Id. at 125, 560 P.2d at 1347.
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requiring fresh approaches.2 18
3. Other Situations Involving Real Property
Real property transactions often raise issues other than the
difference between the value and the contract price. In Julian v.
Buckley,21" defendant sold real property to plaintiff and promised
to construct a road to the property. When defendant failed to con-
struct the road, plaintiff was required to replace a loan commit-
ment at an interest rate of 9.75% over thirty years with a commit-
ment at 11.5%. The court upheld an award of the discounted
difference between the amounts payable at each rate.220 While this
is proper, the court cited Walton v. City of Bozeman 2 1 as author-
ity for an award of "future damages. "222 In Walton, the court erro-
neously awarded plaintiff a sum to be paid each year rather than
the discounted present value of the damages.2 2 While the court in
Julian did not make this error, specifically stating that
"[rlespondent cannot be expected to sue appellants every time the
interest rate changes, 2 24 it would be salutary if Walton were al-
lowed to rest in peace.
While the remedy of specific performance is beyond the scope
of this article, it is notable that in Sawyer-Andecor International
v. Anglin,226 the trial court awarded specific performance or the
alternative award of a judgment for $144,000. Plaintiff had secured
a resale of the property for $144,000 more than it had promised to
pay defendant, so it stood to lose that amount as a result of the
breach. The court held that the money award was "not damages in
the true sense," but was an equitable device to enforce the decree
of specific performance.226 This device is contrary to the principle
that equity is available only when the remedy at law is inadequate,
but it does indeed serve the purpose of "judicial economy. 2 27 The
same interest in economy was behind the dubious award in Wal-
ton, where the court gave defendant the choice of either honoring
218. See Comment, The Default Clause in the Installment Land Contract, 42 MONT.
L. REV. 110 (1981).
219. - Mont. -, 625 P.2d 526 (1981).
220. Id. at -, 625 P.2d at 529. See ANNOTATIONS, supra note 2, § 343 (no Montana
cases found); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcTs § 351, comment e (1981).
221. 179 Mont. 351, 588 P.2d 518 (1978).
222. Julian, - Mont. at -, 625 P.2d at 529.
223. Walton, 179 Mont. 351, 588 P.2d 518.
224. Julian, - Mont. at -, 625 P.2d at 529.
225. - Mont. -, 646 P.2d 1194 (1982).
226. Id. at -, 646 P.2d at 1202.
227. Id.
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an injunction or paying money damages each year.22
D. Personal Property
Damages for the loss of personal property caused by a breach
of contract are the market value of the property lost plus any spe-
cial costs or fees incurred. While there is no statute specifying this
measure of damages, it is another form of the expectancy rule ex-
pressed in section 27-1-311 of the Montana Code Annotated. In
Brown v. Webb,"'9 plaintiff brought a tort action for the loss of
three cows during shipment by trailer. The court affirmed an
award of the market value of the cows plus the sale commission
and transportation costs per cow. It is submitted that the result
would have been the same in contract.
Spackman v. Parsons'30 was a tort action for damage to real
and personal property caused by sewage flooding. The case is sig-
nificant because it has been cited frequently in contract cases for
guidance on damages. 8 1 Application of Spackman to contract
cases is reasonable under the facts, for damages would probably
have been awarded for the same losses if defendant contractor had
been in privity of contract with plaintiff owners.
The significant difference between damages in contract and in
tort is the limitation of contract damages to losses which were fore-
seeable while losses in tort need not have been anticipated to be
compensable.' 8 ' In fact situations such as Spackman, if there had
been a contract between the parties, water damage to property
would probably have been a natural consequence of breach. An-
other significant difference is that the compensatory remedy in tort
is designed to place the injured party in the condition he or she
enjoyed before the injury, while the expectancy remedy in contract
is designed to place the injured party in the position he or she
would have been in had performance occurred. 33 In situations
where the losses are foreseeable, the damages are the same; both
228. Walton, 179 Mont. at 359, 588 P.2d at 522.
229. 173 Mont. 275, 567 P.2d 450 (1977).
230. 147 Mont. 500, 414 P.2d 918 (1966).
231. See, e.g., Baden v. Curtiss Breeding Serv., 380 F. Supp. 243, 245 (D. Mont. 1974);
Chandler v. Madsen, - Mont. -, -, 642 P.2d 1028, 1033 (1982); Harrington v. Holiday
Rambler Corp., 176 Mont. 37, 42, 575 P.2d 578, 581 (1978) (claims for relief in tort and
contract); Agrilease, Inc. v. Gray, 173 Mont. 151, 157, 566 P.2d 1114, 1117 (1977) (claims for
relief in tort and contract); Zook Bros. Contr. Co. v. State, 171 Mont. 64, 76, 556 P.2d 911,
918 (1976).
232. Compare MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-311 (1981) with MONT. CODE ANN. § 21-1-317
(1981). See supra notes 18-30 and accompanying text. See also 5 A. CoRBIN, CONTRACTS §§
1008, 1019 (1964).
233. 5 A. CORIN, CONTRACTS § 992 (1964).
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remedies are designed to confer no unanticipated benefit upon the
injured party. " Another significant difference is the availability of
exemplary damages in a tort action under section 27-1-221 of the
Montana Code Annotated, which expressly prohibits exemplary
damages in contract."s In Spackman, the court reversed an award
of exemplary damages, making the award similar to a contract
award.2" As long as these distinguishing factors are borne in mind,
the discussion of damages in Spackman may be useful in contract
cases.
After reaffirming the simple compensatory rule, the court in
Spackman eloquently expressed the difficulty of application: "In-
genious men have propounded ingenious methods, systems and
formulas for determining in monetary terms the value of property
partially damaged or destroyed. While such methods serve as use-
ful guides, the final answer rests in good sense rather than mechan-
ical application of such formulas."'8 7 The court then recognized
two formulas: (1) in the event of destruction, the market value of
the property at the time of the loss; (2) in the event of damage less
than destruction, the difference in market value before and after
the injury. If, however, repair is possible at less cost than the dim-
inution in value, the measure is the cost of repair plus the value of
the loss of use.2 " In neither case may the recovery ordinarily ex-
ceed the value at the time of injury.2'a As a further rule, in cases
where property of a peculiar value-such as clothing, heirlooms, or
portraits-has no market value, the value can be the value to the
owner, so long as it is not fanciful or unreasonable." 40 The court
held that the trial court's valuation was "totally improper and be-
yond usual test-measures and common sense,""1 principally be-
cause the plaintiff was awarded the replacement cost of used items.
Application of the test-measures and common sense was to prove
particularly difficult in a number of contract cases that followed.
234. If there had been a contract in Spackman, the defendant would have had to com-
plete the work at his expense or pay plaintiff the cost of completion. See supra notes 180-83
and accompanying text. The property loss would be consequential damages resulting from
the breach.
235. See infra notes 298-99 and accompanying text.
236. The availability of tort and contract damages arising out of the same transaction
is beyond the scope of this article. See infra notes 303-10 and accompanying text. See also
Comment, Punitive Damages in Ordinary Contracts, 42 MowT. L. Rzv. 93 (1981).
237. Spackman, 147 Mont. at 506, 414 P.2d at 921-22.
238. Loss of use would probably be recoverable in the event of destruction as well. See
Cuddy v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 390, 392 n.4 (D. Mont. 1980).
239. Spackman, 147 Mont. at 507, 414 P.2d at 922.
240. Id. at 509-10, 414 P.2d at 923. See supra note 199.
241. Id. at 508, 414 P.2d at 922.
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If Spackman presented the kind of routine facts that en-
courage a court to make orderly rules, then Bos v. Dolajak...
presented the bizzare turn of events that necessitates stretching
those rules. In Bos, plaintiffs purchased a secondhand silo in Cali-
fornia for an unstated cost, had it shipped to Montana, and hired
defendants, North Dakota contractors, to erect it: After four days
work, when the silo was just about up, the wind blew it over. De-
fendants went back to North Dakota. Plaintiffs sued in contract
and in tort, and the trial court gave instructions with respect to
both claims. The court held that the instructions were not error
where negligence in the performance of the contract was the proxi-
mate cause of the loss. 43
Defendants argued that the Spackman rules limited plaintiffs'
damages to the value of the property before the loss less the sal-
vage value, or the cost of repair plus the loss of use, not to exceed
the value before the loss.24 The court limited this rule to fact situ-
ations "dealing with readily replaceable items with an established
market value."'"45 The court noted that in Spackman it had stated
that the overriding consideration in computing damages was "good
sense rather than mechanical application of such formulas. '246
Even though there was no jury instruction on this point, the
court also used the rationale that the silo may well have been
property of a peculiar nature, with no market value."7 This last
rationale is off the mark, but not far off. It does not seem tenable
to argue that by its nature the property had no market value, as is
the case with heirlooms or photographs. It is simply that plaintiffs
picked up a bargain where there was no market. In other words,
the value before destruction was not what plaintiffs paid for it, but
the value they created through their efforts. The court finally ac-
knowledged this in holding that the verdict was not contrary to the
law under jury instructions in both tort and contract:
The evidence in the record established that plaintiffs had ac-
quired a secondhand silo which was equivalent to a new silo at a
considerable savings. Thus, the jury could quite properly find
242. 167 Mont. 1, 534 P.2d 1258 (1975).
243. Id. at 8, 534 P.2d at 1261 (citing Gunderson v. Brewster, 154 Mont. 405, 466 P.2d
589 (1970)). The citation is curious, for the claim in Gunderson was purely in tort.
244. The opinion regrettably omits the cost to plaintiffs, making the computations im-
possible to comprehend.
245. Boa, 167 Mont. at 8, 534 P.2d at 1261.
246. Id. at 9, 534 P.2d at 1262 (quoting Spackman, 147 Mont. 500, 506, 414 P.2d 918,
922).
247. Boa, 167 Mont. at 7, 534 P.2d at 1261. See supra note 240 and accompanying
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that the 'market value' (actual value) of the silo at the time of the
loss was between $30,000 and $40,000.24
The decision is probably correct when viewed in light of the
expectancy interest. The court made the common error of stating
that the purpose of the legislative enactment of the expectancy in-
terest, what is now section 27-1-311, is to make the injured party
whole.2 9 In contract, that goal is to give parties what they would
have had if the contract had been performed, not to restore them
to the status quo prior to contracting, as making the injured party
"whole" suggests.25
In Chandler v. Madsen,251  defendant urged that the
Spackman rules be applied to prevent plaintiffs from recovering
more than the value of the property. The court cited Bos for the
proposition that the Spackman rules did not apply "[w]here an
item was not readily replaceable, did not have an established mar-
ket value, and was integral to a larger operation ....,, When
the expectancy interests in the two cases are compared, this anal-
ogy is seen to be faulty. In Bos, the jury awarded its estimation of
the cost of replacing the downed silo plus the incidental damages
for loss of use, less the value of defendants' work in constructing a
foundation. Plaintiffs ended up with exactly what they bargained
for. If they had not resurrected the fallen silo, they would have
been left with less money than they needed to replace it. There
was no windfall."'5 In Chandler, the jury awarded the cost of repair
and the supreme court restored the damages for loss of use. The
value supplied by defendant-the land and salvage value-was not
subtracted. Whether plaintiffs used the money for repair or not,
they got more than they bargained for: a windfall.2 "
E. The Uniform Commercial Code
There are few Montana cases which cite the provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).2 5 In Baden v. Curtiss Breeding
248. Bos, 167 Mont. at 10, 534 P.2d at 1262. It was established that a new silo would
have cost $40,000. Id. at 7, 534 P.2d at 1259.
249. Id. at 6, 534 P.2d at 1260.
250. 5 A. CoRsiN, CoNTRAcTs § 992 (1964).
251. - Mont. -, 642 P.2d 1028 (1982).
252. Id. at -, 642 P.2d at 1033. The latter factor refers to damages in Bos for losses
resulting from inability to use the silo that were apparently part of the jury's award, al-
though the amount was not specified. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
253. Except for the silo, which fell over in the wind.
254. See supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
255. Codified at MoNT. CODe ANN. §§ 30-1-101 through -9-511 (1981).
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Service," defendant sold plaintiff defective semen, resulting in
the loss of a cow crop.2s The applicable statute was what is now
section 30-2-715(2) of the Montana Code Annotated which adopts
the second Hadley rule:
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach
include:
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and
needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to
know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or
otherwise; and
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any
breach of warranty.
The issue was where to draw the line, for as a result of the breach,
plaintiff lost not only the next crop but the succeeding crops that
the lost crop would have produced. The court limited the loss to
one crop, reasoning that the further losses were not foreseeable
and that the risks associated with producing one crop were reason-
ably ascertainable but that eventually "the degree of uncertainty
permitted becomes a question of law. '" 8 The court might have
reached the same result by firmer application of the doctrine of
mitigation, which the court suggested was not the basis of its deci-
sion.2 9 The statute provides for damages for losses "which could
not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise." At the time
plaintiff discovered the loss, he might not technically have been
able to cover, but he could have minimized the loss by replacing
the crop. In this way, only the crop for the one year would have
been lost.
An unusual application of the UCC was found in Hirst v. El-
gin Casket Co.260 When the body of the deceased relative of plain-
256. 380 F. Supp. 243 (D. Mont. 1974).
257. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. Defective sperm was also found to
be a breach of warranty in Waddell v. Am. Breeders Serv., Inc., 161 Mont. 221, 505 P.2d 417
(1973). While the jury instruction on damages was appealed and held not error, the amount
of damages was not discussed.
258. Baden, 380 F. Supp. at 245.
259. In a footnote, the judge stated, "I am not discussing a duty to cover but rather
what persons in the ranching industry might reasonably foresee." 380 F. Supp. at 245 n.1. It
would appear that the foreseeable behavior-replacement of the herd-is required to avoid
the consequences of the breach. The case illustrates the close relationship between the Had-
ley rules and the doctrine of avoidable consequences. In Whitaker v. Farmhand, Inc., 173
Mont. 345, 355, 567 P.2d 916, 922 (1977), Baden is cited for the proposition that "lilt is the
law of Montana that consequential damages cannot accrue past the time the injured party
has knowledge of the failure of the equipment and a reasonable time thereafter within
which to make other arrangements."
260. 438 F. Supp. 906 (D. Mont. 1977).
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tiffs was exhumed, it was discovered that the casket sold by defen-
dant had leaked. The leak in the casket constituted a breach of an
express warranty under what is now section 30-2-313(1) of the
Montana Code Annotated. Consequential damages for breach of
warranty may be awarded under what is now section 30-2-714(3)
and section 30-2-715(2)(b). " 1 Here the only injury was the mental
suffering of the family members who viewed the damaged body.
While liability for mental suffering in the absence of physical in-
jury is rare, the court found that cases involving services furnished
in connection with deaths and funerals "have created exceptions to
the general rule.""' The court nevertheless reduced the jury's
award, finding that plaintiffs had a responsibility to mitigate dam-
ages by limiting the family's exposure to the body.2
A more pedestrian but well-reasoned application of the UCC is
found in Carl Weissman & Sons, Inc. v. Pepper.' Defendant
breached an agreement to buy crushed auto bodies from plaintiff.
Plaintiff incurred expenses in finding another buyer, sold the goods
at a lower price, and suffered vandalism to its equipment. The
court applied the expectancy rule as stated in the UCC at section
30-1-106(1) of the Montana Code Annotated:
(1) The remedies provided by this code shall be liberally adminis-
tered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a
position as if the other party had fully performed but neither con-
sequential or special nor penal damages may be had except as
specifically provided in this code or by other rule of law.
Damages for the sale at a lower price were awarded under section
30-2-703 and section 30-2-706, which permit the aggrieved seller to
resell and recover the difference between the resale price and the
contract price.265 Under section 30-2-710, the aggrieved seller is en-
titled to incidental damages and expenses reasonably incurred as a
result of the breach; here, the cost of finding another buyer.2"6 The
vandalism loss was properly denied under section 30-2-715, for
"the damage did not stem from consequences which were reasona-
bly contemplated by the breaching party at the time the agree-
261. See supra text accompanying notes 256-58.
262. Hirst, 438 F. Supp. at 908. See ANNOTATIONS, supra note 2, § 341; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1981).
263. Hirst, 438 F. Supp. at 908-09.
264. 480 F. Supp. 1364 (D. Mont. 1979).
265. Id. at 1369.
266. Id. It may be noted that outside of the UCC, Montana statutes do not contain
such a provision, but the court has generally upheld awards for such damages under MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-1-311 (1981). See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
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ment was made."'"
Modern Machinery, Inc. v. Flathead County'5 represents the
Montana Supreme Court's first word on contract damages under
the UCC. In Modern the court held that a contract was formed
when the county commissioners accepted plaintiff's bid to sell a
rock crusher in spite of the county's later attempts to repudiate
the transaction,20 0 but the court reversed and remanded the dam-
age award. The trial court's instructions had given the jury broad
discretion to determine damages.2 7 0 Finding these instructions er-
roneous, the supreme court properly tracked the UCC provisions
on seller's remedies while bypassing some thorny issues raised by
those provisions. The court held that the verdict was not sup-
ported by substantial credible evidence, for measured under either
section 30-2-703 or 30-2-706, the loss was far in excess of the dam-
ages awarded. 7'
Section 30-2-703 of the Montana Code Annotated catalogues
the seller's remedies, which include damages measured by (1) the
difference between resale price and contract price under section
30-2-706272 and (2) the difference between market price and con-
tract price or lost profits under section 30-2-708.17 The court did
267. Weissman, 480 F. Supp. at 1369. Cf. Purington v. Sound West, 173 Mont. 106,
566 P.2d 795 (1977) (where plaintiff's claimed "loss of wages, use, and reputation" was held
to be special damages, not the general damages of which the seller had reason to know
under what is now MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-715(2)(a) (1981)). See supra notes 52-55 and
accompanying text.
268. - Mont. -, 656 P.2d 206 (1982).
269. Id. at -' 656 P.2d at 210.
270. Id.
271. Id. at -, 656 P.2d at 211.
272. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-706(1) (1981) provides:
(1) Under the conditions stated in 20-2-703 on seller's remedies, the seller
may resell the goods concerned or the undelivered balance thereof. Where the re-
sale is made in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner the seller may
recover the difference between the resale price and the contract price together
with any incidental damages allowed under the provisions of this chapter (30-2-
710), but less expenses saved in consequence of the buyer's breach.
273. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-708 (1981) provides:
(1) Subject to subsection (2) and to the provisions of this chapter with respect
to proof of market price (30-2-723), the measure of damages for non-acceptance or
repudiation by the buyer is the difference between the market price at the time
and place for tender and the unpaid contract price together with any incidental
damages provided in this chapter (30-2-710), but less expenses saved in conse-
quence of the buyer's breach.
(2) If the measure of damages provided in subsection (1) is inadequate to put
the seller in as good a position as performance would have done when the measure
of damages is the profit (including reasonable overhead) which the seller would
have made from full performance by the buyer, together with any incidental dam-
ages provided in this chapter (30-2-710), due allowance for costs reasonably in-
curred and due credit for payments or proceeds of resale.
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not address the conflict between these two code sections.27 ' In-
stead, the court applied section 30-2-708(2) which is applicable
"[i]f the measure of damages provided in subsection (1) is inade-
quate to put seller in as good a position as performance would have
done. . . ." In that event, lost profits may be awarded. This provi-
sion is designed to assist the volume seller who in effect suffers a
loss because, when goods are resold for the contract price, the re-
sale represents an independent sale which the seller might have
made.27 5 While the court found section 30-2-708(2) applicable,
there was no indication that plaintiff was a volume seller or how
lost profits were computed. In any event, because the loss on resale
was greater than the lost profits,'7 plaintiff's recovery should have
been computed under section 30-2-306 in order to satisfy the ex-
pectancy principle that "the aggrieved party may be put in as good
a position as if the other party had fully performed. . ....
The trial court in Modern, also gave an instruction on the
seller's duty to mitigate which the court found to be erroneous
under section 30-2-704(2).'" That section concerns a situation
where the buyer effectively repudiates while the goods are still un-
finished; the seller must then determine whether abandoning or
completing manufacture would cause less economic loss. In light of
the court's findings, this provision does not seem relevant, for the
county never effectively communicated its repudiation. Plaintiff
therefore properly completed manufacture not because of a duty to
mitigate after repudiation,'27 but because there was no repudia-
tion. The court blamed the mitigation instruction for what seems
to have been a compromise verdict-the jury apparently thinking
plaintiff should have delayed production until the defendant made
up its mind. The instruction on mitigation was proper with respect
to sellers' resale, for section 30-2-706(1) provides for recovery
"[w]here the sale is made in good faith and in a commercially rea-
sonable manner ....
VII. DAMAGES FIXED BY THE PARTIES OR BY THIRD PARTIEs
Liquidated damages are those damages established by the par-
ties at the time of contracting. 79 The traditional hostility to liqui-
274. J. WHrr & R. SuMMERs, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMM-
CIL, CODE § 7-7 (2d ed. 1980).
275. Id. at §§ 7-9, 7-11.
276. Modern, - Mont. at _ 656 P.2d at 210.
277. Id. at , 656 P.2d at 211.
278. Id. at -, 656 P.2d at 210.
279. See ANNOTATIONS, supra note 2, § 339; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRACTS §
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dated damages provisions is seen in section 28-2-721 of the Mon-
tana Code Annotated, which declares them void subject to an
exception:
(1) Every contract by which the amount of damage to be paid or
other compensation to be made for a breach of an obligation is
determined in anticipation thereof is to that extent void, except
as expressly provided in subsection (2).
(2) The parties to a contract may agree therein upon an amount
which shall be presumed to be an amount of damage sustained by
a breach thereof when, from the nature of the case, it would be
impracticable or extremely difficult to fix the actual damage.
The statute reinforces the expectancy doctrine: if the liquidated
damages are out of proportion to the expectancy, the provision will
be voided as a penalty.280
On its face, the statute allows liquidated damages where the
damages are "impracticable or extremely difficult to fix" at the
time of contracting; in that event, the liquidated amount is pre-
sumed to be the amount of damage. The presumption is, however,
rebuttable. Courts often permit it to be rebutted not on the basis
of the situation at the time of contracting, but on the basis of a
comparison of the liquidated damages with the actual damages. In
Morgen & Oswood Construction Co. v. Big Sky of Montana,
Inc.,281 the parties provided for liquidated damages of $500 per day
for construction delays. The owner, Big Sky, was able to meet the
comparative test by presenting evidence showing how it calculated
the $500 figure. It also presented evidence of the actual losses,
which exceeded $500.28' This case illustrates the senselessness of
the comparative test. According to the statute, it is appropriate to
provide for liquidated damages when damages cannot be ac-
curately fixed. Whether actual damages turn out to be close to that
amount is not relevant. And as a policy matter, liquidated damages
are an alternative to litigation. Having provided for them, Big Sky
was compelled to prove in court that it would have recovered more
without them. 8
356 (1981).
280. Liquidated damages are generally permitted for breach of an agreement to con-
vey real property. Hart v. Honrud, 131 Mont. 284, 309 P.2d 329 (1957). In Hart, even
though the parties had provided for liquidated damages in the event of breach, the court
awarded specific performance on the grounds that the vendor had acted in bad faith.
281. 171 Mont. 268, 557 P.2d 1017 (1976).
282. Id. at 271, 557 P.2d at 1019-20.
283. For a justification of liquidated damages on economic grounds, see Goetz and
Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes
on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977).
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Big Sky made one mistake, although not a fatal one. In draft-
ing the contract, it referred to the $500 figure as a penalty. The
court held that use of the term was not dispositive of the issue.
Just as damages termed "liquidated damages" may on closer in-
spection be a penalty, so may those termed "penalty" prove to be
liquidated damages."' The decision is a carefully reasoned en-
dorsement of the concept of liquidated damages, although use of
the comparative test can only discourage potential users. It is
hoped that the concept will meet with continuing judicial approval
in other circumstances where the parties freely bargain.""
In State ex rel. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph
Co. v. District Court,25 6 the court found that Mountain States' con-
tractual limitation of liability for the omission of advertising from
the "Yellow Pages" to the amount of the charge for the ad was not
liquidated damages but a "maximum recovery." The customer ar-
gued that the contract was unconscionable given the lack of bar-
gaining power and the monopolistic nature of the telephone com-
pany.2 87 The court found this argument unpersuasive, given the
public nature of the monopoly, the lack of an opportunity to cor-
rect the error, and the similarity of the service to a listing in the
white pages:
Without a demonstration of bad faith, fraud, or willful or wanton
conduct by Mountain States, a limitation of liability for errors
and omissions in its advertising expressed in a written and signed
contract is reasonable and nowise against public policy and it is
within the power of the company and subscribers to its directory
to make such contracts and they become a valid and binding
limitation.2"
Another means of fixing damages is to refer the question to a
third party. In Polley's Lumber Co. v. United States,ss an esti-
mate of damages was "to be made under the direction of the officer
284. Morgen & Oswood, 171 Mont. at 272-74, 557 P.2d at 1020-21. See 5 A. CORBIN,
CoNTRAcrs § 1072, at 405-07 (1964).
285. See also B&L Painting Co. v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 165 Mont. 359, 527 P.2d 554
(1974) (fifty dollars per day liquidated damages apparently not disputed by the contractor);
Diehl & Assoc., Inc. v. Houtchens, 173 Mont. 372, 567 P.2d 930 (1977) ($500 earnest money
enforced as liquidated damages).
286. 160 Mont. 443, 503 P.2d 526 (1972).
287. Id. at 449-50, 503 P.2d at 530 (distinguishing Allen v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 18
Mich. App. 632, 171 N.W.2d 689 (1969)).
288. Mountain States, 160 Mont. at 451, 503 P.2d at 531. The customer was not listed
in the white pages either; the court held that recovery for that omission was limited to the
amount of the charge by the Public Service Commission tariff. Id. at 445-48, 503 P.2d at
528-29.
289. 115 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1940).
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approving this contract."2 90 The breaching party challenged the
procedure as violating what is now section 28-2-708 of the Mon-
tana Code Annotated: "Every stipulation or condition in a contract
by which any party thereto is restricted from enforcing his rights
under the contract by the usual proceedings in the ordinary tribu-
nals or which limits the time within which he may thus enforce his
rights is void." Applying Montana law, the court noted that this
section has been held to bar the arbitration of disputes.2 91 The
court held that damages are a question of fact and an arbitrator's
resolution of factual questions does not oust the courts of jurisdic-
tion.292 The determination was held to be conclusive absent bad
faith, gross mistake, or failure to exercise honest judgment.2 93 It is
worth noting that arbitration could assist in the orderly resolution
of damage disputes, particularly in complex areas such as construc-
tion contracts.2 9'
VIII. RECOVERY IN ADDITION TO DAMAGES FOR BREACH
A. Preface
As noted in the introduction, in practice the expectancy the-
ory does not put the plaintiff in the position he or she would have
been in had defendant performed. 295 The theory equalizes the cost
of performance with the cost of breach, ignoring the fact that per-
formance costs the plaintiff nothing but the contract price while
breach costs the plaintiff the additional expense of a lawsuit. For
example, the author criticized the court for conferring a windfall
upon the plaintiffs in Chandler v. Madsen.2 One can imagine the
Chandlers' indignant response:
What windfall? Get out of your ivory tower and look at what we
had to cope with. After putting up with the hassles with the
builder, trying to live in that godawful house, paying our lawyer,
being dragged through discovery and trial, taking time off work,
trying to collect the money, getting it at a crummy interest rate,
not recovering out-of-pocket costs, and worst of all, waiting, wait-
290. Id. at 752.
291. Id. at 754. See Note, Contract Clause Providing for Arbitration of Future Dis-
putes Is Not Enforceable in Montana, 24 MONT. L. REV. 77 (1963).
292. Polley's Lumber, 115 F.2d at 754. See Palmer Steel Structures v. Westech, Inc.,
178 Mont. 347, 584 P.2d 152 (1978).
293. Polley's Lumber, 115 F.2d at 754-55.
294. The author believes MONT. CODE ANN. § 29-2-708 (1981) should be repealed. See
Corbett, Arbitration in Montana and the Need for New Legislation, MONT. LAWYER, Feb.
1981, at 5.
295. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
296. - Mont. -, 642 P.2d 1028 (1982). See supra text accompanying notes 251-54.
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ing, waiting, you are trying to tell us we got something for
nothing?
Of course, they are right. If breach costs less than perform-
ance, a party motivated largely by economic considerations will
generally choose breach. But as the list of grievances indicates, the
fault may lie not so much with the theory of contract damages as
with the system within which the theory is applied. That is, if the
system compelled the losing party to pay the expenses of the law-
suit, a true expectancy would be achieved. While each aspect of
expenses merits full inquiry, they are surveyed here only to indi-
cate the parameters within which the legal system allows recovery
in addition to contract damages.
B. Exemplary Damages
The Montana rule on exemplary damages is consonant with
American jurisprudence: exemplary damages may not be awarded
in an action based on a breach of contract.29 7 Section 27-1-221 of
the Montana Code Annotated provides that:
In any action for a breach of an obligation not arising from con-
tract where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or
malice, actual or presumed, the jury, in addition to the actual
damages, may give damages for the sake of example and by way
of punishing the defendant.
The rule rests on the underlying theory of compensatory damages:
the promisee should be placed only in as good a position as if the
promisor had performed.'9
The rule is applied irrespective of the motive of the breacher,
or the willfulness or fraudulence of his or her actions. Corbin justi-
fies this principle with relation to other wrongs:
Breaches of contract ... do not in general cause as much resent-
ment or other mental and physical discomfort as do the wrongs
called torts and crimes. Therefore, the remedies to prevent them
and to prevent disorder and breach of the peace by satisfying the
injured parties, are not so severe upon the wrongdoer. 2"
297. See, e.g., W.R. Wade v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 255 F. Supp. 735 (D. Mont. 1966);
Ryan v. Aid, Inc., 146 Mont. 299, 406 P.2d 373 (1965); Westfall v. Motors Ins. Corp., 140
Mont. 564, 374 P.2d 96 (1962). See also ANNOTATIONS, supra note 2, § 342; RESTATEEmNT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981).
298. 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 992 (1964).
299. Id. § 1077, at 438. In Westfall, 140 Mont. 564, 374 P.2d 96, the court held that
fradulent procurement of a release as part of a contract transaction was a breach of an
obligation arising out of contract.
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There is undoubtedly insufficient empirical data to evaluate this
explanation. It is arguable that the harm done by the system is so
great that those most affected by it, businesses engaged in constant
interaction, simply ignore it.300 Other explanations of the rule are
also possible, such as the need for law in a capitalist system to
protect the interest in having money flow freely to where it is most
efficiently utilized.301 Whatever the reason, there is no question but
that the sanctity of promise as such is not protected. 2
In order to secure an award of exemplary damages in Mon-
tana, a plaintiff must generally affirm the contract to sue on the
tort.3 03 It appears that this requirement is not strictly applied.
Montana courts have awarded exemplary damages in tort actions
involving a contract 0 4 where defendant breached a duty indepen-
dent of the contractual duty and defendant's behavior was pro-
scribed by section 27-1-221.305 In Harrington v. Holiday Ram-
bler,"0 6 the court stated that "an action on the contract and an
action for fraud or misrepresentation in the inducement of the
contract are not incompatible. ' 30 7 Apparently when plaintiff al-
leged that the exemplary damages were justified by defendant's
misrepresentations to the general public, the tort was separate and
distinct from the contract.308 In Jardine, Stephenson, Blewett &
Weaver v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,3°0 the court de-
nied a motion to strike plaintiffs claim for exemplary damages,
holding that under Montana law, delay in paying attorneys' fees on
completion of the contract was a tort independent of the
contract.310
300. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
301. See Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEGAL
STUD. 277 (1972).
302. See supra notes 9-11.
303. See Comment, Punitive Damages on Ordinary Contracts, 42 MONT. L. REV. 93
(1981). The special case of insurance contracts is treated in Harman, An Insurer's Liability
for the Tort of Bad Faith, 42 MONT. L. REV. 67 (1981).
304. Gilmore suggests that Torts and Contracts will eventually be merged into a single
subject called Contorts. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 90 (1974).
305. See supra notes 297-98 and accompanying text.
306. 176 Mont. 37, 575 P.2d 578 (1978).
307. Id. at 46, 575 P.2d at 583. See also Falls Sand & Gravel Co. v. W. Concrete, Inc.,
270 F. Supp. 495, 500 (D. Mont. 1967).
308. Harrington, 176 Mont. at 46-47, 575 P.2d at 583. This factor does not seem suffi-
cient to distinguish the case from Ryan, 146 Mont. at 302-03, 406 P.2d at 374-75, where the
court denied punitive damages for fraudulent inducement to enter a contract.
309. 91 F.R.D. 284 (D. Mont. 1981).
310. The court did not state how defendant's behavior allegedly fell within the pro-
scriptions of MoNr. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221 (1981).
[Vol. 44
46
Montana Law Review, Vol. 44 [1983], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol44/iss1/1
CONTRACT DAMAGES
C. Attorneys' Fees
In the absence of contractual agreement or specific statutory
authority, each party pays its own attorneys' fees." ' Attorneys'
fees are generally not recoverable even when the losing party
caused the plaintiff unnecessary expenses during litigation and dis-
covery.3 12 But if by contractual provision, one party is entitled to
recover attorneys' fees, that provision is reciprocal to all other par-
ties to the contrct 31 3
Often such a provision creates an issue as to what is a "reason-
able" fee. In Olson v. Carter,3 14 the court remanded an award
where plaintiff's attorney spent fifteen hours on the case but billed
his client on a contingency fee basis; to a damage award of
$20,037.41, the district court had added attorneys' fees of
$6,679.14.315 Where such fees are recoverable by statute or by
agreement, fees for appeal to the supreme court are recoverable as
well.316
D. Costs
While attorneys' fees are usually the greatest expense of litiga-
tion, they are not a "cost. '31 7 Costs are allowed as a statutory mat-
ter of right when a plaintiff in a contract action recovers over fifty
dollars or when judgment is entered in favor of defendant.31 But
the particular costs allowable are strictly limited in section 25-10-
201 of the Montana Code Annotated.3 9 Even the allowable costs
311. See, e.g., Winer v. Jonal Corp., 169 Mont. 247, 545 P.2d 1094 (1976) (fees
awarded to attorney who represented himself); Kintner v. Harr, 146 Mont. 461, 408 P.2d 487
(1965). Statutory exceptions include MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-9-511 (foreclosure on person-
alty); 39-3-214 (recovery of wages), see supra notes 154-64 and accompanying text; 71-1-233
(foreclosure on realty); 71-3-124 (1981) (foreclosure on lien).
312. Miller v. Titeca, - Mont. -, 628 P.2d 670 (1981).
313. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-3-704 (198i). See, e.g., Lyle v. Moore, - Mont. -, 599
P.2d 336 (1979); Diehl & Assoc., Inc. v. Houtchens, 180 Mont. 48, 588 P.2d 1014 (1979).
314. 175 Mont. 105, 572 P.2d 1238 (1977).
315. Id. at 110-11, 572 P.2d at 1241 (citing guidelines for the computation of attor-
neys' fees found in Crncevich v. Georgetown Recreation Corp., 168 Mont. 113, 541 P.2d 56
(1975). The guidelines are essentially those of the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY DR 2-106(B) (1980)).
316. See, e.g., Diehl & Assoc., Inc. v. Houtchens, 180 Mont. 48, 588 P.2d 1014 (1979)
(prevailing party under agreement, $1000 award); Figgins v. Stevenson, 163 Mont. 425, 517
P.2d 735 (1973) (foreclosure on lien, $500 award).
317. Kintner v. Harr, 146 Mont. 461, 480, 408 P.2d 487, 497-98 (1965).
318. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 25-10-101(3), -102 (1981).
319. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-10-201 (1981) provides:
A party to whom costs are awarded in an action is entitled to include in his bill of
costs his necessary disbursements, as follows:
(1) the legal fees of witnesses, including mileage, or referees or other officers;
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may be limited or obsolete. For example, the fees of witnesses are
allowable, but by statute the fees of an expert witness are the same
as any other witness; that fee is ten dollars per day plus mileage at
the rate of three cents per mile less than the mileage rate allowed
by the Internal Revenue Service for the preceding year.2 0
Costs on appeal are automatically recoverable by the success-
ful party, but are subject to the discretion of the court when a new
trial is ordered or a judgment is modified.32' If the discretion is not
exercised, each party pays its own costs.22
E. Interest
Interest as damages is includable in a judgment.32 3 Section 27-
1-211 provides: "Every person who is entitled to recover damages
certain or capable of being made certain by calculation and the
right to recover which is vested in him upon a particular day is
entitled also to recover interest thereon from that day. . . ." The
rationale is that because money has a "use" value, interest reflect-
ing this "use" by the defendant is a legitimate element in provid-
ing the plaintiff with full compensation. 24
The right to recover interest does not vest until the defendant
(2) the expenses of taking depositions;
(3) the legal fees for publication when publication is directed;
(4) the legal fees paid for filing and recording papers and certified copies
thereof necessarily used in the action or on the trial;
(5) the legal fees paid stenographers for per diem or for copies;
(6) the reasonable expenses of printing papers for a hearing when required by
a rule of court;
(7) the reasonable expenses of making transcript for the supreme court;
(8) the reasonable expenses for making a map or maps if required and neces-
sary to be used on trial or hearing; and
(9) such other reasonable and necessary expenses as are taxable according to
the course and practice of the court or by express provision of law.
320. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 25-10-201(1), 26-2-505, 26-2-501, 2-18-503 (1981). See also
Johnson v. Ferguson, 158 Mont. 170, 175-77, 489 P.2d 1032, 1035 (1971) (cost of a discovery
deposition for the benefit of the deposing party was held not recoverable).
321. MONT. R. APP. Civ. P. 33; MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-10-104 (1981). Interesting ques-
tions may arise as to whether one is a "successful party." In State ex rel. Nesbitt v. Dist. Ct.,
119 Mont. 198, 173 P.2d 412 (1946), the court held that plaintiff was the successful party
even when the court held the judgment excessive and reduced it. See also State ex rel.
O'Sullivan v. Dist. Ct., 119 Mont. 189, 172 P.2d 816 (1946), where the court held that a
party who obtained a supreme court order reversing dismissal of a petition was not a suc-
cessful party when a new petition could have been filed.
Costs may be awarded for a frivolous appeal pursuant to MONT. R. APP. Civ. P. 32. See
Sun Dial Land Co. v. Gold Creek Ranches, Inc., - Mont. -, 645 P.2d 936 (1982).
322. Lloyd v. City of Great Falls, 117 Mont. 588, 87 P.2d 187 (1939).
323. See ANNOTATIONS, supra note 2, § 337; RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF CONTRACTS §
356 (1981).
324. 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1045-46 (1964).
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knows or should know of the sum certain due the plaintiff,32 5 which
is not necessarily at the time of breach. For example, in United
States v. Fuller,3 26 interest ran from the date the injury occurred
where a defendant could have ascertained the amount by consult-
ing plaintiff; but in Lapke v. Hunt,827 interest commenced running
against a surety upon the filing of the complaint when no previous
demand had been made upon the surety.
When the sum is not certain until fixed by the finder of fact,
interest commences running from the date of the decision. For ex-
ample, in Carriger v. Ballenger,""' where a homeowner brought an
action against a contractor who failed to complete the excavation
and installation of his basement, the court held that while plaintiff
was theoretically entitled to recover interest damages from the
date of breach, interest would not begin to run until the damages
were determined by the trial court.32' Similarly, in an action in
quantum meruit, the plaintiff is not entitled to interest until the
finder of fact determines the amount due, for in quantum meruit,
it is axiomatic that the damages would not be ascertainable until
trial.330
The legal rate of prejudgment interest is stated in section 31-
1-106 of the Montana Code Annotated: "[U]nless there is an ex-
press contract in writing fixing a different rate. . . interest is pay-
able on all moneys at the rate of 6% a year. . . ." The supreme
court has overruled district court decisions which awarded a higher
rate of interest.33' But when the interest rate on deposits exceeds
the statutory rate, plaintiffs are not fully compensated for the use
of their money, and defendants may be encouraged to wait until
judgment before paying money and interest owed to plaintiffs.3
325. While this is the majority (and Montana) rule, a significant number of jurisdic-
tions allow interest on unliquidated claims. See 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTs § 1048, at 294-300
(1964).
326. 250 F. Supp. 649 (D. Mont. 1965).
327. 151 Mont. 450, 443 P.2d 493 (1968).
328. - Mont. -, 628 P.2d 1106 (1981).
329. Id. at -, 628 P.2d at 1110.
330. See, e.g., Am. Sur. Co. of N.Y. v. Cove Irr. Dist., 54 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1931);
Eskestrand v. Wunder, 94 Mont. 57, 20 P.2d 622 (1933).
331. Big Sky Livestock v. Herzog, 171 Mont. 407, 558 P.2d 1107 (1976) (ten percent
interest erroneously included in judgment); Purington v. Sound West, Inc., 173 Mont. 106,
566 P.2d 795 (1977) (eight percent interest erroneously included in judgment). In Purington,
the statutory rate was not cited as authority for the holding; the interest rate was reduced to
the six percent prayed for in the complaint under MONT. R. Civ. P. 54(c). Id. at 111, 566
P.2d at 798.
332. The interest rate on judgments is ten percent. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-9-205
(1981). Because interest is not compounded, even this rate may be below the return on
investments. The Internal Revenue Service has taken steps to avoid this loan of money at
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IX. CONCLUSION
Although this article has been confined to a discussion of
Montana law, there is nothing unique in Montana's approach to
the problem of contract damages. Montana may have more statu-
tory law than many jurisdictions, but the statutes largely codify
the common law. While the problems and concepts are universal,
looking at the microcosm of one state facilitates study of how rules
have been developed and applied by the courts and how the sys-
tem might be improved.
In his monumental treatise, Corbin uses the phrase "working
rules" to describe contract law.3 3 The qualification is significant.
One hesitates before attempting to establish fixed rules of contract
damages for two reasons. First, one would quickly discover the in-
adequacy of the rules in varying fact situations; and second, as a
function of the first, the rules would be so inconsistently followed
as to cease to be rules at all. This poses a dilemma for reform of
the system. To suggest new rules is to avoid dealing with the com-
plex fact situations confronting the courts; to suggest consistency
in the application of the old rules is to sacrifice the flexiblity re-
quired to achieve just and reasonable results.
Reform might take the direction of encouraging performance
by would-be breachers. In a pure expectancy situation, breach is
not discouraged, for it costs no more than performance. If conse-
quential damages are added, the cost of breach may increase sig-
nificantly. The system is, however, reluctant to increase the dam-
ages. In applying the Hadley rules, courts have generally found
that the parties did not foresee extensive losses. Those that were
foreseen may be limited by the doctrine of avoidable consequences.
And at trial, losses may be limited by application of the doctrine of
certainty. With all these barriers to the enforcement of promises, is
it any wonder that aggrieved parties might be tempted to engage
in "private wars" to resolve their disputes? 3 4
Another alternative is for the attorney and client to practice
preventive law by anticipating the problem and providing for it at
the time of contracting. The parties might agree, for example, to
favorable rates. See I.R.C. § 6621.
333. A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS III (1964). See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
334. See, e.g., United States v. Holder, 302 F. Supp. 296 (D. Mont. 1969); People v.
Rosenberg, 194 Colo. 423, 572 P.2d 1211 (1978).
The phrase "private war" is from 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1002 (1964). Corbin recog-
nizes that in the absence of judicial remedies, persons will resort to self-help. But he may
underestimate the frustration that can result from inadequate and inefficient judicial reme-
dies. See Leff, supra note 10.
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pay the winner's attorneys' fees in the event of litigation, to arbi-
trate disputes, or to liquidate the damages. These suggestions,
while providing for less expensive and more expedient resolution of
disputes, are themselves fraught with difficulties. The first assumes
a disposition not to be the contract breaker; the second assumes
the other party will not become aware that agreements to arbitrate
future disputes are unenforceable in Montana; and the third con-
tains such obstacles that it may itself be the subject of litigation.
In spite of such difficulties, to focus on keeping the parties out
of court-either by discouraging breach or by resolving dis-
putes-would seem more productive than to focus on solving the
problems in court. Changes that might discourage breach by facili-
tating recovery of the aggrieved party's actual losses include realis-
tic awards of costs and attorneys' fees, market interest rates, and
expedited collection of judgments. Changes that might facilitate
the resolution of disputes include the court's relaxation of strict
review of liquidated damages and the legislature's repeal of the
statute barring arbitration.
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